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This study examines the media’s role in the legitimization of the 1981 Maze 
Prison Hunger Strike in Northern Ireland by members of the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (IRA
2
) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). The 
strike was ultimately a protest by these groups of their status as common 
criminals and an effort to regain ‘special category’ prisoner status. If they were 
able to legitimize their actions in the eyes of their communities, then they could 
have been capable of placing enough political pressure on the British government 
to concede the hunger strikers’ demands.  In modern times, the media has become 
a powerful tool for terrorist organizations to gain support and recognition for 
their cause.  However, in the case of the 1981 hunger strike, the media worked 
against the legitimization of the strikers which prevented them from achieving 
their political objectives. This study is a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
the strike’s coverage in the Belfast Telegraph and the Irish Independent, two 
influential Irish newspapers. It seeks to reconcile the coverage of the strike in the 
print media with its components of legitimacy to understand why the strike was 
unable to ultimately force concessions from the British. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1981, ten Republican paramilitary prisoners starved themselves to death in pursuit of 
special category prisoner status while incarcerated in the Maze Prison of Northern Ireland.
3
  The 
men represented two separate paramilitary organizations, the Provisional Irish Republican Army 
(IRA) and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).  They were serving prison sentences for 
various violent offenses related to their membership in these organizations.  The hunger strike 
was the last in a series of Republican prisoner protests over a new policy adopted by the British 
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government in 1976, known as “Ulsterisation.”4  More directly, it was a protest over their newly 
ascribed “criminal” status by the Northern Irish and British governments.  They sought to push 
the British into reinstating their special category status by using their lives as leverage.  The 
recognition of their acts of self-sacrifice by both the Irish and international communities were to 
prove that they did not share the same selfish motivations as criminals.  The sheer number of 
deaths during the strike questions how such a lethal form of political protest could occur in 
modern times and involve the government of such an influential democratic nation.  
The press coverage surrounding the strike made international headlines and focused the 
international community’s attention and efforts toward aiding in the negotiation process.  Even 
under international scrutiny the British government, then led by Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, held firm against the constant external pressures to meet the prisoners’ demands.  It 
was up to internal pressure from the Northern Irish communities to force concessions from the 
Thatcher government.  The IRA was unable to rally this support from its community and the 
strike ended unsuccessfully.  The strike was forced to end after the families of the hunger strikers 
continuously sought medical intervention for their loved ones once they lost consciousness.  
Preventing further deaths removed the urgency and pressure that was essential to the strike’s 
success.  Just over seven months after its start, the IRA was forced to end the strike without the 
any of their five demands being met.  After the strike had officially ended, the British 
government did make several adjustments to alleviate the humanitarian concerns associated with 
the harsh prison conditions in the Maze. However, none of these adjustments recognized the 
political motivations of the Republican prisoners.  If measured by the success of achieving its 
political objectives, the strike was a complete failure for the Republican paramilitaries in 
Northern Ireland. 
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The purpose of this study is to understand why the strike did not achieve legitimacy for 
the IRA by analyzing the role of the media in influencing the opinions of the Irish communities 
in Northern Ireland and the Republic.  Analysis of the strike’s coverage in both the Belfast 
Telegraph and the Irish Independent has shown that the media may have undermined the 
legitimization of the hunger strikers and their cause, thus affecting the resolution of the strike.  
Before moving onto this analysis, it is important to understand the complexity of the history and 
culture surrounding the hunger strike and how both contributed to the strike’s conception and 
ultimate resolution.  While a hunger strike death toll of this magnitude was an anomaly in Irish 
history, the act of hunger striking itself was no stranger to Irish society nor was its use as a 
protest over the British government’s involvement in Irish affairs.  Political protest, including 
hunger striking, has played a key role in the development of Irish Nationalism since its 
beginnings in the late eighteenth century.  Many cultural and historical factors coincided in 1981 
to act as catalysts for the hunger strike and ultimately lead to the death of ten men inside the 
Maze Prison of Northern Ireland. 
 
A Historical Theme of Self-Sacrifice 
Republicanism from Wolfe Tone – 20th Century 
By the 1790’s, the British government had successfully adopted the Irish government as 
its own; the leaders of the Irish administration were responsible to and appointed by their British 
counterparts.   Britain’s political control of Ireland was challenged by the birth of an organization 
known as the Society of United Irishmen in 1791.  That which began as an organization of 
constitutional reform in Ireland became a revolutionary body by the turn of the century.  This 
group of largely middle class Irishmen sought political equality and parliamentary reform that 
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would include civil rights for all Irish citizens, including Catholics.  Their most influential 
member was a man named Theobald Wolfe Tone.  It was partly under his inspiration that the 
group sought a revolutionary approach to political reform.  In 1798, a series of uprisings 
occurred throughout Ireland as a staged rebellion by the United Irishmen.  While the Rising of 
1798 lacked organization and was unsuccessful in its attempt to disrupt British rule in Ireland, 
from its ashes Irish Republicanism was born.  Wolfe Tone effectively became the first 
Republican martyr after his self-inflicted death during his imprisonment after the Rising.
5
   
Nineteenth century Republicanism hoped to resurrect the original United Irish movement 
after the disaster of the Rising.  In July of 1803, Republican leader Robert Emmet staged a 
second rebellion. Once again the rebellion was severely flawed in its execution and the rebels 
were unsuccessful.  While the failure of this rebellion ended the United Irish conspiracy, Emmet 
joined Wolf Tone as an Irish nationalist hero soon after being put to death by the British.  The 
legend of Emmet that emerged after his death served to inspire others with its distinct Catholic 
and nationalist tone.
6
  Wolfe Tone and Emmet began a line of romanticized Republican martyrs 
that inspired others to continue the Republican tradition in Ireland. 
In 1916, a group known as the Irish Volunteers in deference to the original Volunteers of 
the late eighteenth century staged a rebellion on Easter Monday in an attempt to begin an Irish 
revolution.  As was tradition with Irish Republican uprisings at this time, the Easter Rising was 
primarily a disaster for the rebels themselves.  However, much like its predecessors it was a 
victory for Irish Republicanism and set the stage for the Irish War of Independence which began 
only three short years later.
7
  The Irish War of Independence
8
 and its aftermath set the stage for 
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British-Irish relations in the 20
th
 century.  After the war, Ireland was partitioned into two separate 
states by the Government of Ireland Act.  One, the Republic, became a Free State in the United 
Kingdom while the other, the province of Ulster, would remain under the control of the British 
government with its gerrymandered Protestant majority.
9
  This province is what would become 
known as Northern Ireland. 
The separation of Ireland into parts based on religious majorities had pronounced 
political implications.  Northern Ireland became a state in which a historically marginalized 
minority found themselves confronted with majority Protestant rule.  Even with a comfortable 
majority, their political history would keep Ulster Protestants constantly on the defensive.
10
  The 
Stormont government of Northern Ireland reflected this defensive ideology by putting into place 
both political and social obstacles for the Catholic community.  The violence that ensued during 
the second half of the 20
th
 century was largely a result of these political barriers.  They would 
also serve as a revival of the Republican tradition during a period known as the “Troubles”.  A 
small and unsuccessful uprising in the eighteenth century created a domino effect of mass 
political and ideological movement in Ireland that would last through the twentieth century.  
More importantly, the founders of this tradition and their followers had achieved immortality 
through martyrdom.  The Republican tradition was founded and fueled by the self-sacrifice of its 
leaders, giving the concept of self-sacrifice a distinctly Irish flavor. 
 
Nationalist Tradition and “Irishness” of Self-Sacrifice 
 Self-sacrifice, in its various forms, has been a well-known phenomenon in twentieth 
century Irish politics.  It has become the ultimate test of one’s dedication to a cause.  While most 
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often associated with contemporary Irish politics and 20
th
 century Republicanism, the tradition of 
self-sacrifice has played an integral role in Irish history and in the Irish Nationalist tradition.  
From the pre-Christian era to the second half of the twentieth century, self-sacrifice has emerged 
and reemerged causing scholars to refer to this theme as the Irish cult of self-sacrifice.  To 
further explore the “Irishness” of self-sacrifice, the historical background of this phenomenon 
will be analyzed as well as why such a phenomenon has emerged in Irish culture and history. 
Hunger striking as a form of social redress can be traced back to the pre-Christian era in 
Ireland when those who wished to address a grievance chose to hunger strike on the doorstep of 
their wrong-doer.  Death was rarely a result of these early fasts because of the social pressure 
placed on the wrong-doer to compensate the faster.  From the perspective of the powerless in 
Ireland, the only weapon they had against the powerful was their own life.
11
  After Christianity 
had established itself in Ireland, fasting and self-sacrifice became more of a symbolic gesture to 
the Irish as a means of identifying with the suffering and self-sacrifice of Christ.   
The birth of Republicanism in the eighteenth century created a new avenue for self-
sacrifice to continue its presence in Irish tradition.  The death of Wolfe Tone revitalized the 
concept of self-sacrifice in Ireland as a means of gaining support and recognition from the 
public.  It was only after his death that the Irish public showed support for Wolfe Tone’s 
Republican ideology.  When others like Emmet followed in Wolfe Tone’s footsteps, self-
sacrifice was shaped to increase the momentum of the Republican movement in Ireland.  The 
self-sacrifice of its followers served to elevate the Republican cause among the Irish Catholic 
population.  The immortalization and legendary celebrity status of the first Republican martyrs 
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also helped to make self-sacrifice a staple of the Irish tradition.  The prospect of eternal glory and 
honor solidified the concept of self-sacrifice in Irish politics.   
Hunger striking remerged during the first quarter of the twentieth century as a useful tool 
for the reemerging ideologies of self-sacrifice and militant republicanism at the time.  The ten-
year period of 1913-23 witnessed thousands of prisoners, both men and women, participate in 
hunger strikes organized against the British government and after 1922, the Irish Free State 
authorities.  These politically motivated fasts centered on the perception of unjust imprisonment 
and the demand for political status.  As a result of this decade of hunger strikes, a total of seven 
prisoners died.
12
  Several of those who participated in these strikes would join the ranks of Irish 
Republicanism’s greatest legends.   
The effectiveness of hunger striking as a form of political protest was first noted during 
the post-Easter Rising era when the Volunteer Thomas Ashe (1885-1917) died while fasting as a 
result of being force-fed by prison authorities.  Although his death was not the result of 
starvation, thousands poured into the streets of Dublin and joined his funeral procession in 
protest.
13
  The most noted hunger striker of this time was the Lord Mayor of Cork, Terence 
MacSwiney, who protested the minor charges against him by hunger striking while imprisoned.  
After seventy-four days and numerous failed attempts at force-feeding, MacSwiney died on 25 
October 1920.  His sacrificial death symbolized resistance to British rule in the eyes of the Irish 
community and placed him among the ranks of Irish Republican martyrs.  Before his death, he 
foreshadowed the Republican protests of the remainder of the century by stating, “It is not those 
who can inflict the most but those who can endure the most that will conquer.”14  These early 
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martyrs like MacSwiney became role models for the later generations of Republicans.  The 
public interest that followed the deaths of these hunger strikers showed the potential power that 
such fatal protesting could have in amassing support for their cause.  A means of protest capable 
of attracting this level of attention and support would become critical to a successful Republican 
campaign.   
The IRA as an organization was no stranger to the tactic of hunger striking before the 
strike in 1981.  The granting of special category status had itself been the result of pressure 
placed on the British government by an IRA prison hunger strike in 1972.
15
  Likewise, there 
were individuals who, for various reasons, individually chose to hunger strike in protest while 
incarcerated throughout the second half of the 20
th
 century.  Among these was Chief of Staff 
Sean MacStiofain, who was arrested and charged with six months in jail for his leadership role 
and participation in the IRA.
16
  Even the hunger strike in 1981 was the second attempt of 
organizing a Republican hunger strike in the Maze Prison.  The first began with the same 
motives as the second but ended before any deaths could occur.
17
 The overarching theme of self-
sacrifice can be seen throughout much of Irish history, taking the form of the hunger strike for 
much of the past century. 
The theme of self-sacrifice poses important questions as to how and why such a theme 
successfully integrated itself into contemporary Irish society.  The tentative model of self-
sacrifice in Ireland by D. J. O’Neill can be used to answer many of these questions.  He suggests 
five societal and individual needs that may account for the so-called “cult of self-sacrifice” in 
Irish society.  To begin, self-sacrifice may be the only alternative for movements lacking 
                                                                                                                                                             
 Contemporary History 28 (2003): 428. 
15
 See “Troubles” section for more detail on the events that surrounded this hunger strike and its resulting 
concessions. 
16
 Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, (London: Penguin, 2007), 118. 
17
 See “Maze Prison Protests” section for more detail on the first Maze Prison hunger strike. 
Black 9 
 
manpower, resources, and popular support like the Republican movements seen throughout Irish 
history.  Even at the beginning of such a tradition, hunger striking was used by the powerless 
against the powerful for they had no other means of ventilating their grievances.  Self-sacrifice 
can also demonstrate legitimacy by establishing the importance and validity of a cause.  
Willingness to die for a cause elevates and legitimizes that cause in the eyes of many in Irish 
society.  The cult of self-sacrifice as a means of reinforcing this theme in Irish Nationalism also 
serves to inspire others to commit acts of self-sacrifice for the cause by venerating those who 
have previously sacrificed for the cause.  Moreover, this creates a link between the members of a 
movement and their heroic martyrs, allowing those involved in a cause to share in the glory of 
their heroes.  Finally, the Irish and Catholic ascetic traditions may have caused the suffering and 
deprivation of the Irish to manifest itself in unorthodox and extreme events.
18
  Thus, the 
“Irishness” of self-sacrifice and its cult-like manifestation can be attributed to attempts to meet 
collective and individual societal needs in a culture with a history of deprivation and oppression. 
 
 “The Troubles” and the Reemergence of the Theme of Self-Sacrifice 
In the aftermath of the War of Independence, a period of relative political calm emerged 
throughout the two partitions of Ireland.  The mid-twentieth century brought a time of political 
and social change throughout the Western world following the fall of the Nazi regime in World 
War II.  Northern Ireland saw considerable economic prosperity during this time, which helped 
to close the economic gaps that had previously existed between the two religious communities.  
By the 1960’s, the Catholic Nationalist community was beginning to regain its footing in 
Northern Irish politics.  Not only had post-war education programs greatly expanded the Catholic 
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middle class, but, Catholics were beginning to take advantage of these new economic 
opportunities to voice their opinions in politics.  Many of these voices were critical of Northern 
Ireland’s political union with Great Britain and the limited rights that Catholics enjoyed under 
the Stormont government.  Inspired by the American Civil Rights Movement, Catholics became 
forming non-violent protest organizations.  In 1967, the Northern Ireland Civil Rights 
Association (NICRA) began to organize and attract large numbers of supporters in the northern 
districts.  It is during the protest marches of this organization that violence in Northern Ireland 
broke out again.  The international community watched in horror as cameramen filmed 
peacefully protesting civilians severely beaten by members of the police.
19
   
The British government responded to the violence by deploying troops to patrol and 
contain the communities of Northern Ireland, although their attention was focus on the 
community they were originally sent to protect: the Catholics.  Left defenseless, recruits flooded 
into the newly formed IRA paramilitary organization to defend their families and community 
from the British troops and loyalist paramilitaries.  From the start of the civil rights movement, 
tensions between Protestants and Catholics in the North would take less than a decade to burst 
into indiscriminate violence and chaos that would consume Northern Ireland over the following 
decade.  The breaking point came in 1969 and in its wake a period of destabilizing violence 
known as the “Troubles” began.  The Republican theme of self-sacrifice reemerged during the 
Troubles as men committed themselves to death in return for reverence from their community.  
True to its name, the Troubles was a period of marked violence and destruction that shook 
Northern Ireland and demanded intense social and political change.  Over the next thirty years, 
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over 3,600 lives would be lost in the battles between the British government and the Northern 
Irish paramilitary organizations.
20
 
Significant conciliatory efforts were made in 1972 in an attempt to lessen the violence 
and destruction.  Then Secretary of State, William Whitelaw, defused a Republican prison 
hunger strike by granting the prisoners “special category status.”  The IRA and other 
paramilitary groups were given public recognition that their crimes were politically motivated.  
Whitelaw also made another serious conciliatory move in 1972 when he met directly with the 
leadership of the IRA.  While both parties were steadfast in their refusal to make concessions, the 
very fact that the meeting took place would give the IRA reason to believe that the British, 
contrary to their political rhetoric, would indeed negotiate with paramilitary groups.
21
  This 
would also come into play during the 1981 hunger strike when the IRA would expect then Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher to do the same.  Unfortunately, Thatcher did not show the same 
willingness to negotiate with the IRA as had other British politicians.  She had lost one of her 
closest aides, Airey Neave, just months before the election in 1979 when a bomb that had been 
planted on his car by members of the INLA exploded as he drove out of the House of Commons.   
Only a few short months into her tenure, eighteen British soldiers at Warrenpoint in County 
Down and the Queen’s cousin, Lord Mountbatten, were killed in IRA attacks.22  If Thatcher had 
not previously adopted a hard-line attitude toward the IRA before these attacks, she certainly did 
afterwards.   
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The Maze Prison Protests 
Ulsterisation 
In 1976, newly appointed Labour Secretary of State Roy Mason began a serious effort to 
change the British government’s approach to paramilitary violence.  These strategic changes 
became known as ‘criminalization’ or ‘Ulsterisation.’  The former name reflected policy that 
sought to criminalize the actions of paramilitary groups, and in effect removed Whitelaw’s 
“special category status” for Republican prisoners.  The latter referred to the localization of law 
enforcement efforts, making the political violence of Northern Ireland into a law-and-order 
issue.
23
  It de-emphasized the role of the British army and handed the conflict over to the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the police force of Northern Ireland.
24
  Persons caught for 
paramilitary offenses would thereafter be sentenced and tried in the same fashion as common 
criminals. 
From the perspective of the government, the boundary between political and criminal 
action had been erected, and the Republicans were clearly located on the latter’s side.  The 
Republican prisoners, however, refuted the label of “terrorists” and protested that their actions 
did not originate from selfish motivations.  Their motivation, they asserted, was purely political 
in nature and therefore further merited special category prisoner status.
25
  Thus, on 16 September 
1976 the first member of the IRA convicted under the Ulsterisation policy, Ciaran Nugent, 
refused the prison uniform and wrapped himself instead in his prison blanket.
26
  Since the prison 
uniform was the mark of a criminal, this action was a rejection of criminal status in both a literal 
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and symbolic sense.  Symbolism itself was to play a key role in the Maze Prison protests and 
soon hundreds of other Republican prisons would join Nugent in his protest, sending a message 
to the British government and the international community that they would not stand to be 
treated as criminals.  The Blanket Protest, as it was later named, would mark the beginning of an 
escalating series of Republican protests in the Maze Prison that would culminate with the 1981 
hunger strike. 
 
The Blanket, No-Wash, and Dirty Protests 
 Although the Republican protests of the Ulsterisation policy were not confined to the 
Maze Prison, the largest and most notable protests occurred there.  Those who donned the 
blanket in the Maze faced the consequences of non-conforming prisoners.  By 1978, there were 
already over 300 non-conforming Republican prisoners ‘on the blanket.’  In the protest’s third 
year, the prison system seemed to be containing it and it had amassed little support outside the 
prison.
27
  If the Republican prisoners were not able to attract attention in the outside world, then 
the protest would be a failure.  It was only through calling attention to their protests that they 
stood a chance in reclaiming special category status.  This realization led to an escalation in the 
protests and a move into the ‘No-Wash’ and ‘Dirty’ phases. 
 The prison protest escalated into the ‘No Wash’ protest after the non-conforming 
prisoners refused to leave their cells to wash or to empty their chamber pots.  The protest soon 
took a new name of the ‘Dirty’ protest as prisoners began spreading their excrement on the walls 
of their cells to keep the prison guards from entering.  Prison authorities, threatened by maggot 
and disease infestation, had to forcibly remove the prisoners to bathe them and allow their cells 
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to be cleaned with special equipment.  The forced baths and cell cleanings only caused further 
hostilities between the prisoners and the guards.  After a visit to the prison, the leader of 
Ireland’s Catholic Church Cardinal Thomas O’Fiaich made a rather publicized declaration of the 
horrific conditions of the prison and drew a distinction between the Republican prisoners and 
common criminals.  Although this was the beginning of the propaganda war between the 
government and the prisoners, the media had yet to capitalize on the news of the Maze protests.   
 
The First Republican Hunger Strike 
 After the relative lack of success in their previous protests, the prisoners decided to 
unleash their ultimate weapon against the government: the hunger strike.  The first hunger strike 
began in October of 1980, marking the end of all other protests to concentrate all efforts on the 
strike.  The strikers made five demands of the British government: the right to wear their own 
clothes, the right to free association, no prison dictated work, weekly letters, visits, and parcels, 
as well as restoration of all lost remission due to the previous protests.
28
  By granting these 
demands, the government would also in effect be granting special category status.   
The first seven men to go on hunger strike comprised six members of the IRA and one 
member of the INLA.  All seven participants were to begin the strike at the same time, therefore 
creating a quickly mounting death toll once the men began reaching the critical phase in their 
fasts.  This “critical phase” as it was named, referred to the period during the fast where the 
striker was at a serious risk of dying.  It was also a critical phase in the strike because it was 
hoped that the ominous threat of men dying would force the British government to break the 
deadlock and result in a victory without having to incur any real casualties.  In December, the 
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prisoners were forced to call off the hunger strike prematurely when one of the seven strikers 
was removed at the point of death to a Belfast hospital.  While the prisoners initially claimed 
victory, it soon became apparent that the government had no real intention of meeting any of 
their demands.
29
  The frustration caused from the speculated broken promises of the British 
government fueled further resentment from the prisoners and they quickly began organizing a 
second strike, against the will of an outside leadership afraid that a second unsuccessful strike 
would only further add to the embarrassment of the first. 
 
The Second Republican Hunger Strike 
 The second strike began on 1 March 1981 with Bobby Sands, the Commanding Officer 
of the IRA prisoners, leading a phased version of the original strike.  This time, men from both 
Republican paramilitary organizations would join the strike in two week intervals to increase the 
pressure on the British government.  As one man died on the strike, another would replace him.  
There would be a narrow window of opportunity for the British to make the necessary 
concessions after each death.  The decision to begin another strike was entirely that of the 
prisoners.  The outside leadership strongly advised the prisoners not to begin another strike for 
fear of diluting the organization’s resources.  Staggering the deaths would also prevent the men 
from collectively acting to save another’s life.  Once the first striker died, each succeeding death 
would place increasing social pressure on the remaining strikers to see the strike to its end.  
 On some level, the second strike did produce a major propaganda battle and mounting 
tensions in the region.  Most Nationalists who came to support the prison protests did so because 
of their resentment of Margaret Thatcher’s inflexibility.  Numerous third party organizations, 
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both political and non-political, attempted to mediate the dispute between the government and 
the prisoners to no avail.  Then, only five days into the strike, the sudden death of Nationalist MP 
Frank Maguire created a by-election during which striker Bobby Sands defeated the former 
Unionist party leader Harry West to begin what would eventually become the IRA’s road to 
politics.  This sent a loud message to the British government that Bobby Sands supporters 
numbered high enough to achieve an electoral victory. 
 Sands received a seat among the greatest Republican martyrs when he became the first 
striker to die on 5 May 1981.  An estimated 100,000 people attended his funeral.  Sands’ death 
also marked the beginning of the international community’s interest and involvement in the 
strike.  Even with the newfound interest in the strike, negotiations dragged on with no resolution 
in sight and violence threatened to consume the country as the death toll rose from unrest caused 
by the strike.  Among the dead were many innocent men, women, and children who were simply 
in the wrong place at the wrong time.  Resentment soared, and with it, retaliatory violence.
30
  As 
the months dragged on, neither side showed any movement despite efforts from international 
peace organizations and religious institutions.   
Due to the staggering of the strike, there was over a month of crucial negotiation time 
between the deaths of the fourth and fifth strikers.  Unfortunately, the two sides did not reach an 
agreement before the death of the fifth striker, Joe McDonnell, and the strike continued with no 
end in sight.  Between May and August of that year, ten hunger strikers died.  Prison chaplain Fr. 
Denis Faul began encouraging the families of the strikers to intervene once their loved ones lost 
consciousness.  Faced with the futility of continuing a strike against familial intervention, the 
prisoners called off the strike in October 1981, without any concessions from the British 
                                                 
30
 David McKittrick and David McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles: The Story of the Conflict in Northern Ireland 
(Chicago: New Amsterdam, 2002), 143-44. 
Black 17 
 
government.  Afterwards, newly appointed Secretary of State James Prior eased prison 
regulations and allowed the prisoners to wear their own clothing along with other limited 
concessions to their demands.  Special category status was not among them. 
 
Chapter 1: Subject Approach and Methodology 
Legitimization 
Meaning and Importance of Legitimacy through Self-Sacrifice 
 Legitimacy is the lifeline and means to an end of terrorist organizations.  To legitimate is 
to show or affirm someone or something to be justified.
31
  Thus, gaining legitimacy is a crucial 
step for terrorist organizations because it justifies their extraordinary acts of violence against 
persons or states and gives these organizations moral grounds to continue their campaigns of 
terror.  Without legitimacy, the organizations would appear politically superfluous, losing the 
concept of political motivation.  The power to determine whether the goals and actions of an 
organization are legitimate lies in the hands of the community it targets.  There are several 
methods used by these organizations to gain legitimacy in spite of the indiscriminate violence 
they condone and carry out. 
The most basic of these methods is to gain the emotional support of the community.  
Often times this involves the organization proving the justness of a cause through its dedication 
to it.  To gain legitimacy this way, as particularly seen in the case of the 1981 hunger strike, an 
organization will often appeal to its target community at a symbolic or emotional level through 
acts of self-sacrifice.  A shared set of religious beliefs can also be used to further support for the 
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terrorist organization.  The emphasis on religion by the organization not only plays a central role 
in emotional appeal but also places its actors in a position that reflects the community’s interests 
or ideals.
32
  Self-sacrifice in connection with beliefs that define a community can even be defined 
as altruistic suicide.   
With altruistic suicide, the goal of the suicide act goes beyond the actor toward the aid of 
a group in which he participates. Thus, this form of suicide is named for its intense altruistic 
character.  But most instances of altruistic suicide are performed as a duty, and are therefore 
obligatory.  Martyrdom, the ultimate self-sacrifice, enters the foreground when the act of 
altruistic suicide is no longer expressly obligatory.  Although public opinion may be generally 
favorable toward the act, the pressure is less direct on the actor to commit suicide.  Here, the man 
who takes his life in circumstances that do not require him to do so gains social prestige.  His act 
of suicide is not from hopelessness or despair but, rather, from a desire to obtain a goal that is 
outside the confinements of the realm of life.  The altruistic suicide is an act that, unlike egoistic 
or selfish suicide, is not driven by the individual but rather that individual’s commitment to an 
ethics to which life is subordinate.
33
  Members of that society are compelled to support an 
organization that professes to represent them and their ideals through acts of self-sacrifice. 
Altruistic suicide has been more often found among lower and more primitive societies 
although the more recent deaths of Christian martyrs can also fall into this category of suicide.  
Although they did not take their own lives, they sought an inevitable death and acted with full 
knowledge of the impending consequences of their actions.  In their final act of faith, they 
discarded their individualism in favor of their beliefs.  They renounced life for something they 
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loved more than themselves.
34
  Early Christian martyrs testified to the power of their faith 
through their willingness to die for it; they were witness to something greater than themselves.  
Their martyrdom serves as an inspiration to modern day Christians of true commitment to their 
faith.  While their sacrifices may have converted many, their acts may have also been seen as 
futile to those who did not profess or understand the Christian faith.  Thus, the nature of altruistic 
suicide as centered on the beliefs of a community calls for a common source of morality to be 
understood and valued.  This is especially true for the case of the IRA in Northern Ireland. 
The sources of morality and legitimacy involved in the acts of the hunger strikers are 
found in their political community, especially in regards to their deaths.  The hunger strikers and 
their acts of self-sacrifice played upon aspects of the Irish Nationalist culture that were poorly 
understood by the British, non-Catholic actors because they did not reflect a universally accepted 
morality or tradition.
35
  Through their self-sacrifice, the IRA was able to isolate its community 
and use a shared ideology as a divider between their enemy (the British state) and their 
supporters (the Catholic community).  The self-sacrifice of the hunger strikers in particular 
would also have been an effective way of showing the dedication that the members of the IRA 
had to their cause.  It underlined their political motivations to the Northern Irish community as a 
whole.  Their self-sacrifice would have also strengthened the religious ties to their community 
through its connection with Catholic tradition. 
 
Martyrdom in Catholicism and the Religious Aspect of Self-Sacrifice 
Its identification with the Catholic religion most definitely linked the IRA to the 
Nationalist community.  Although arguments exist on the extent to which the organization itself 
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followed the Catholic religion, the IRA was culturally Catholic in that its members were 
predominantly raised in Catholic families and held a common tradition as members of the 
Catholic minority in Northern Ireland.  The hunger strikers sought to portray themselves to the 
Catholic community as martyrs, since martyrdom as an important concept in Catholic theological 
history would help to legitimize their actions. 
The concept of martyrdom in Catholicism came from the Greek word martus as it was 
first used to describe the Apostles of Christ.  This word signifies ‘a witness who testifies to a fact 
of which he has knowledge from personal observation’ although even in the context of its first 
use in describing the Apostles, there is a pronounced element of self-sacrifice.
36
  The Apostles of 
Christ faced the daily threat of severe punishment, even death, for their testimony to the life and 
works of Christ.  According to tradition and the Bible, all but one of the twelve died for 
professing their faith; two were even crucified in the same manner as Christ. Thus, the term 
‘martyr’ came to signify a witness of Christ who would choose to suffer death rather than deny 
his faith.  Though martyrs suffered the threat of death for their beliefs, it was only through a 
gradual process that the term was applied exclusively to those who had actually died for the 
faith.  Before the term gained this exclusivity by the middle of the fourth century, there existed 
living martyrs who had bravely endured torture and other perils for their faith. 
Early Christians suffered more than a century of mass religious persecution over which 
countless numbers of men, women, and children made the ultimate sacrifice for their faith.  It is 
with little surprise that these innumerable sufferings faced by early Christians have been 
venerated by the Church.  Relics from these martyrs are highly valued and displayed throughout 
the world in numerous churches.  Throughout the Middle Ages, Christians endured many 
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hardships to visit the shrines in which these relics were contained.  Martyrs were respected and 
honored as those who won the greatest victory through their freedom of conscious of death.
37
  It 
is the ambition of many faithful to emulate this dedication to their faith. 
Although martyrdom through religious persecution in the early Church is revered by the 
modern one, there exists now a great emphasis on the sanctity of life.  Modern Christian societies 
profess a particularly strong aversion to suicide because they assign a greater importance to the 
life of the individual.  Despite theories of man and his destiny, this moderate individualism 
prevents these societies from condoning suicides, especially during the modern era of relatively 
significant religious tolerance.
38
  However, from a theological standpoint, Catholicism still 
allows certain justifications for taking one’s own life.  Life, according to the Catholic religion, is 
sacred and cannot be given up for any reason except when one’s death is self-sacrificial to honor 
God or to save the lives of other people.  The former justification mirrors the actions of early 
martyrs while the latter mirrors the story of Christ, who laid down his life for this purpose.  This 
self-sacrifice does not seek its own advantage or edification, but the advantage and edification of 
those whom the act saves.  It is voluntary, purposeful, and done out of true love for the sake of 
others.
39
  Ultimately, it is through the emulation of Christ’s sacrifice for others that the hunger 
strikers strove to achieve consistency with the doctrine of the Catholic community.  
If the hunger strikers were not consistent with Catholic teachings on self-sacrifice, then 
they risked being labeled as suicides.  Catholicism as a whole is particularly unkind to the 
concept of egoistic suicide.  Taking one’s life is a sin against God, especially when the action is 
calculated and not made in a moment of desperation or intense emotional disarray.  If the hunger 
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strikers orchestrated the strike themselves and did in fact willingly refuse food to the point of 
death, then their acts could be seen as sinful.  Suicide in and of itself is also quite foreign to 
Catholic nations, leading to the possibility of an added stigma to the hunger strikers’ actions 
from local and international Catholic communities.  There is a negative relationship between the 
percentage of Catholics and the average number of suicides in European states in particular.
40
  
This shows that there likely exist some factors, rather religious or cultural, which make suicide 
less likely among Catholic populations.  This in particular could have created a substantial 
obstacle for the strikers on their road to legitimacy.  The nature and cause of the suicide may 
create a platform for inconsistency with Catholic teachings.  Thus, proving their actions fell into 
one of the categories of exception within the framework of Catholic Doctrine was imperative to 
acquiring the legitimacy they sought from their community.   
 
Components of Legitimization 
For each organization of violence, there are different components of legitimization.  In 
the case of legitimizing the 1981 hunger strike, there are three important components.  The first 
is to prove their actions were acts of self-sacrifice, and not suicide.  The second component 
follows that the hunger strikers must have been acting of their own free will.  Lastly, the 
motivation of the hunger strikers being political and not selfish in nature.  These components 
depend not on the ideology or actions of the hunger strikers themselves, but on the perceptions of 
their community.  Regardless of the beliefs of the hunger strikers, to achieve legitimacy they 
would have had to have conveyed those beliefs successfully to their community.  
  The first critical component of legitimizing their cause would be to define their actions 
as those of self-sacrifice, not suicide.  An action deemed as self-sacrifice would have compelled 
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their community to support their actions, especially given the Republican tradition of self-
sacrifice that was still prevalent in Irish society.  On the other hand, suicide as an act of killing 
oneself voluntarily and intentionally could not have been supported or legitimized by a 
community that followed Catholic religious traditions.
41
  The Catholic Church and community of 
Northern Ireland would have been faced with deciding whether or not death on hunger strike 
constituted voluntary death (and therefore suicide) or an act of self-sacrifice.  Language in the 
media would also be especially important to distinguishing between the two acts, as would the 
competing Protestant ideology of the time. 
 The second component is the perception of the hunger strikers as acting on their own free 
will.  If the outside organization was using the strikers to gain publicity or win elections despite 
the futility of the gaining their demands and special-category status, then theirs were not acts of 
true self-sacrifice.  An act cannot be seen as self-sacrifice if it was not the actor himself who was 
fully aware of the circumstances and consequences of his actions. Their actions could not have 
been those of true self-sacrifice if they had been used or manipulated from any actor or actors 
inside or outside of the prison.  If it was the outside leadership who was prolonging the strike and 
causing the deaths of the strikers, then the strikers would have been characterized as simply 
pawns of their organizations; their deaths seen as further murders carried-out by an organization 
known for its indiscriminate violence. 
 Lastly, the third component of legitimization involves the perception of the nature of their 
actions as being selflessly and politically motivated.  The IRA considered any act of violence as 
an act of war against a government they saw as illegitimate.  Thus, they professed themselves to 
be separate from common criminals in their motivation.  If they were perceived as criminals, 
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then they would not have been justified in demanding special-category status.  Not only did this 
concept come into play in how the strikers were portrayed in the newspapers, but also how the 
actions of their organizations outside of the prison were depicted during this time.  If their 
actions were seen as selfish or criminal in nature, their efforts to achieve political prisoner status 
could not have been legitimized by their community.   
 These components of achieving legitimacy are important to analyze in the media 
surrounding the strikes.  Given the influence of the media on public opinion and perception, the 
media could have posed a threat to this legitimacy had they been inconsistent with any of these 
three components.   The media had access to an open line of communication in the daily lives of 
the public while the prisoners were very much isolated from the outside world.  All three 
components will later be analyzed through the media’s portrayal of the hunger strike in the Irish 
Independent and Belfast Telegraph to test whether or not these three components were upheld by 
the papers.  If they were undermined, the papers’ portrayal of the strike may have been a critical 
factor in undermining the strikers’ cause and prevented them from achieving the legitimacy they 
needed to obtain their demands. 
 
Subject Introduction 
Current Literature on the Subject 
 There is a plethora of scholarly research that has been done on the Northern Irish hunger 
strikes and the topic of the media in relation to terrorist organizations.  For the 1981 strike in 
particular, there are several different images that current research and documentation convey.  
Each contributes a different yet important perspective on the strike.  There are four specific 
works that were especially relevant to this research.  
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 The first of these is an especially detailed version of events written by British journalist 
David Beresford.  In his book, Ten Men Dead: the Story of the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike, 
Beresford compiles an account of the hunger strike from the smuggled letters or “comms” sent 
back and forth between the prisoners in order to communicate and coordinate their efforts 
throughout the strike.  Beresford appealed to the IRA leadership for the ability to sift through 
thousands of comms in order to piece together the events inside and outside the prison.  He seeks 
to recreate the daily prison life experience from inside the Maze by supplementing his narrative 
with the comms.  The narrative is primarily comprised of contemporary newspaper reports from 
the time and personal interviews conducted by Beresford with those involved indirectly and 
direct in the strike.  He also pulled from his own writings as he was assigned to the coverage of 
Northern Ireland by the British newspaper The Guardian.  It is a very complete and compelling 
work written from the perspective of someone just outside the immediate effects of the strike yet 
still able to give personal witness to its events. 
 Another especially significant perspective of the strike comes in Padraig O’Malley’s 
Biting at the Grave: The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair.  Like Beresford, 
O’Malley seeks to retell the story of the 1981 hunger strike but this time by emphasizing its 
religious component.  In his book, he records the theological struggle between the Catholic and 
Protestants Churches of Northern Ireland.  O’Malley highlights the extensive involvement of 
Church officials in negotiations and also the mounting pressure placed on the Catholic Church by 
its Protestant counterpart to declare the strikers as suicides.  His work adds the religious and also 
political angle of the strike and contributes evidence that further reveals the multi-layered 
complexity of the strike.  It contests the notion that the strike was a stalemate solely between the 
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British government and the Republican prisoners.  For this reason, it is an especially relevant and 
important element of scholarship on the strike. 
An extremely controversial and thought-provoking work is Richard O’Rawe’s 
Blanketmen.  Published nearly twenty-five years after the hunger strike, Blanketmen retells the 
story of the H-Block hunger strike from O’Rawe’s perspective as press officer for the IRA’s 
Maze prisoners.  In this account, O’Rawe accuses the outside leadership of prolonging the 
hunger strike despite the British concession to nearly all five of the prisoners’ demands.  He 
claims that a settlement was reached between the prisoners and a secret correspondent from the 
British government, codename “Mountain Climber,” that could have ended the strike after the 
fourth striker died, avoiding the deaths of the last sixth strikers.  O’Rawe accuses the outside 
leadership of prolonging the strike for political and electoral reasons; he insists the strikers were 
being used as pawns by their leaders.  This angle on the story of the hunger strike reveals another 
potential obstacle to the strikers’ obtaining their demands.  There are those who feel that the 
strikers were not acting on their own accord and O’Rawe’s account confirms these feelings.  
What it does not take into account, however, is that while several of the demands had been 
conceded by the British through the Mountain Climber Initiative, political status was not one of 
them.  Consequently, the outside leadership would not have seen these concessions as sufficient 
enough to end the strike without the main ideological component having been conceded.   
 The scholarly article that was most instrumental to this research is that of Aogan 
Mulcahy’s.  In his article, “Claims-Making and the Construction of Legitimacy: Press Coverage 
of the 1981 Northern Irish Hunger Strike,” Mulcahy demonstrates the importance of the claims-
making of the media to the legitimacy of the hunger strike.  He examines the media’s role in the 
construction of legitimacy through its claims-making process through a qualitative analysis of 
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coverage in the Irish Times, the London Times, and the New York Times.  This analysis is broken 
down into four sub-categories: parliamentary elections, deaths, funerals, and the hunger strikers 
themselves.  He concludes that the lack of support for the strike, the routinization of its events, 
and the emphasis placed on critiquing the British government undermined the strikers’ quest for 
legitimacy.  His research is broad in its focus and pulls from papers located in Dublin, London, 
and New York respectively; therefore creating a more international image of the news coverage 
from that time. 
 
Significance of Further Research 
 The research that has been done surrounding the Irish hunger strike of 1981 does not 
align completely with the outcome of the strike.  By many accounts, especially the secondary 
accounts of the second strike itself, it is unclear as to why the hunger strikers were not able to 
achieve their demands.  As is common with retrospective research, these scholars are able to 
piece together the various parts and perspectives of the strike to form a more complete picture 
that was not shared by those who actually witnessed and participated in the events surrounding 
the strike.  Had the public been aware of the chain of events in the prison as seen from the 
strikers’ point of view as well as their overall ideologies, the resolution of the strike may have 
taken place on different terms. 
 This research attempts to shed light on why the strike ended as it did through analyzing 
the construction of legitimacy in its basic ideological form.  What this research seeks to do is to 
analyze the components of legitimacy through the one source from which the Irish public could 
have gained reliable information on the events of the strike: the print media.  It seeks to take a 
closer look at the print media of Northern Ireland and Ireland, limiting the international element 
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that Mulcahy has analyzed.  Analyzing the print media in relation to the outcome of the strike 
may bridge the gap between the retrospective secondary research and the primary accounts of 
those directly involved.  
 
Methodology 
 The primary research analysis of this paper was done by isolating newspaper articles that 
covered the hunger strike over the roughly eight month period of the strike from March-October 
of 1981.  Each of the papers was scanned from articles pertaining to the politics, events, and 
opinions surrounding the hunger strike.  For the purposes of the quantitative section, articles 
were divided based on the source, the month and tone of the news coverage, and the location of 
the article as it appeared in the newspaper.  For the qualitative section, the articles were then 
separated based on their topic of coverage and were then further divided into six categories that 
could have influenced or undermined the three components of legitimization.  These six 
categories were then used to compare the coverage of the two papers to look for any further 
trends that appeared.  A sample was drawn from each of the categories in order to limit and 
isolate the most relevant and pertinent articles for this research 
The Belfast Telegraph and the Irish Independent are the two newspapers chosen for this 
analysis for several reasons.  Firstly, the geographic location of the papers was central to 
analyzing the direct effect that their papers could have had on the communities of both Northern 
Ireland and the Republic.  The papers are headquartered in Belfast and Dublin, the capital cities 
of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, which gives them a large and diverse readership 
as well as easy access to the governmental and political figures of the time.  The Telegraph 
would have had more direct contact with the political and social repercussions of the hunger 
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strike while the Independent was more removed from the direct effects of the strike given its 
location in the Republic.  Both papers could reach a wide audience to keep them informed on the 
events of the strike, as well as potentially influence public opinion on it.  They were also well-
respected among their communities and boasted high circulations. 
 
Terrorism & the Media 
The Media as a Tool for Terrorist Organizations 
 All terrorist organizations wish to take actions that will maximize the public attention and 
recognition given to their organization.  Acts of violence are carried out to attract enough 
attention to communicate that organization’s goals.42  Because the ultimate goal of terrorist 
organizations is to communicate with the public through their actions, the mass media has 
become an important tool for these organizations.  The information revolution of the twentieth 
century has created mass media-oriented terrorist groups that carry out their activities to attract 
international media attention.  The openness of contemporary society combined with almost 
unlimited communication possibilities has placed the role of the media at center stage in both the 
transmission and dissemination of information.
43
   
 The media capitalizes on sensation-invoking news which terrorist organizations are more 
than capable of providing.  News coverage of death and violence at the hands of these 
organizations, even if abhorred by the public, elevates them to a position of power through the 
invocation of fear.  On the other hand, media coverage may also serve to legitimize an 
organization in the eyes of its followers.  In his 1969 book, Minimanual of the Urban Guerilla, 
Brazilian terrorist and modern terror “theorist” Carlos Marighella put it this way: “to inform 
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about the revolutionists’ actions is enough for the modern mass media to become an important 
tool of propaganda and that the psychological war is a technique of fight, based on direct or 
indirect usage of the mass media.”  It is only through maximum publicity that terrorist 
organizations have the most potential to effect political change. 
 Fortunately for these organizations, the mass media does not hesitate to publicize their 
actions.  The mass media hopes to hold public interest with stories that are attention-grabbing 
and dramatic in order to raise their ratings and company profits.  Where profits are concerned, 
news companies tend to ignore the political implications of such reporting.  Media influence is 
such that the new term “propaganda war” has been coined to describe the struggle of terrorist 
organizations to utilize the media to justify their goals while also fending off damage from 
negative publicity.  One of the major objectives in a propaganda war is to mobilize wider support 
for a cause through demonstrating the rightness and inevitability of it.  This also has the potential 
to increase future recruitment and raise funds for an organization.  The media then becomes a 
tool for sustaining the future existence of an organization.  Keeping this in mind, terrorist 
organizations are still unable to completely control the mass media.  These organizations are 
constantly working toward manipulating and exploiting the media for their purposes under the 
imminent threat of negative publicity.
44
 
Especially relevant to this research are the ways in which the media can effectively be 
used for counterterrorism strategies.  Broadcasting in an objective manner the violence against 
the innocent and the deaths caused by terrorist organizations can help to undermine the 
organization’s cause.  Showing these organizations in this light helps to decrease the extent to 
which the public believes them to exemplify principles such as freedom and justice.  Essentially 
it counters the ability of terrorists to use the media to convince the public that their cause is a just 
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one.
45
  By adopting certain strategies such as these, the media can become a weapon used against 
terrorist organizations.  Northern Ireland is one case where a Western liberal state used the media 
in its counterterrorism strategy.   
The second great revolution in mass communication had occurred in 1968, around the 
beginning of the Troubles in Northern Ireland.  The United States had just launched the first 
television satellite, accelerating news broadcasting and giving terrorist organizations a new 
weapon in propaganda.  The long-lasting struggle with paramilitary organizations in Northern 
Ireland, and the technological innovations in the mass media, forced the British government to be 
among the first who recognized the importance of the media in its fight against terrorism.  They 
implemented a set of regulations that instructed journalists in their reporting.  These instructions 
stressed the responsibility of the journalist to report the truth in a concise and careful way while 
avoiding speculation.
46
  The hope was that this would contain the extent to which the media 
could be used to fuel the propaganda machine for terrorists and give the public a more realistic 
take on the conflict.   
The British government under the Thatcher administration was also no stranger to media 
censorship and manipulation.  Prime Minister Thatcher demanded that in a time of such serious 
terrorist threats, the British government deprive terrorist organizations of publicity through a ban 
on broadcasting declarations or statements by terrorist spokespersons.  The British were not the 
only government that used censorship against Republican paramilitaries.  In its Media Act of 
1960, the Republic of Ireland banned the interviewing of all terrorist spokespersons as well.  The 
Republic attributes this act to a decrease in voter support for the political wing of the IRA, Sinn 
Fein, and diminished the legitimacy they had previously gained from the media.  After a 
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ceasefire was signed in the Republic, these bans were lifted.
47
  Before the hunger strike began in 
1981, both Northern Ireland and the Republic had experience with manipulating the media so 
that it could not be used as a propaganda weapon for paramilitaries. 
 
The Social Construction of Martyrdom 
 How martyrdom is constructed is an important element to be used in analyzing the media 
and its role in the legitimization of terrorist organizations.  The modern construction of 
martyrdom deviates significantly from the classical definition that is generally accepted by most 
scholars.  This defines martyrdom to be an act of fatal religious witness for the purpose of 
demonstrating one’s faith and commitment.  While there are some issues that remain with this 
definition, it sets a universal concept of martyrdom as a connection between commitment, risk-
taking, and death.  Even after acknowledging this framework, martyrs are not made by their 
actions and deaths alone.  They can only be recognized as martyrs by ‘martyrologists,’ or those 
who describe and characterize their deaths.  The actions and beliefs of the martyrologist is the 
driving force behind the construction of martyrdom.  In modern times, martyrologists have 
broken away from the confinements of the classical definition of martyrdom and sought to 
produce martyrs of their own conception.  Ultimately, martyrdom has become a product of social 
construction, making the importance of the media in creating martyrs an ever increasing one. 
 When the continuation of a political cause is at risk, the capacity to create martyrs rests 
primarily with the martyrologists and not the martyr himself.  These socially constructed 
designations of martyrdom typically occur in situations of widespread public mourning, for an 
individual of celebrity status or one whose death was caused at the hands of an enemy.  When 
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these deaths are labeled as “martyrs” it elevates them to a level that they would not have 
previously achieved through their deaths alone.  By virtue of the socially constructed martyr, 
martyr status is assigned more on the evil doing of the enemy than on the actions or beliefs of the 
martyr.  The self-sacrifice and beliefs of the martyr become irrelevant while constructed 
martyrdom mirrors victimization.  What matters to martyrologists is how and to what degree a 
martyr’s death can be dramatized and used to glorify the cause.48   
The Republican tradition itself has been fueled by the construction of martyrs in a way 
that serves to motivate its followers and further its tradition.  The recount of nearly every 
Republican martyr contains some element of social reconstruction.  Wolfe Tone, himself the first 
recognized Republican martyr, was from a Protestant background.  Republican martyrs are most 
easily constructed when very little is known for certain about them as individuals.  The legend of 
Robert Emmet after his death was easily molded into the Republican tradition because the reality 
of his life could not spoil the myth of it.  Despite little being known about his life, the martyrdom 
of Emmet would be used as an inspiration for Republicans over the two centuries following his 
death.
49
  The deaths of the hunger strikers in 1981 also fall into the category of socially 
constructed martyrs.  While Bobby Sands is the most notable of these socially constructed 
martyrs, the strikers are seen as modern day versions of their Republican predecessors.  The 
glorification of their deaths in the Republican tradition has little root in the actual events 
surrounding the hunger strike, nor in their beliefs.  While they were unsuccessful in achieving 
their five demands and obtaining political status, they did achieve immortality by means of the 
Republican tradition of martyrdom.    
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Historical Background of the Newspapers 
The Belfast Telegraph 
 The Belfast Telegraph was founded in November of 1861 by the Baird brothers, William 
and George.  They came from very conservative backgrounds and were members of the Orange 
Order, a Protestant fraternal organization concentrated mainly in Northern Ireland and Scotland.  
The Orange Order has generally been associated with staunch unionism and the Belfast 
Telegraph began as a very conservative, pro-unionist paper.
50
  Despite its conservative 
beginnings, over the next century the paper would become the most liberal newspaper in Belfast.  
During the time of the Troubles, the Telegraph earned a reputation for liberalism by supporting 
then Prime Minister Terence O’Neill and his efforts to lead the Unionist Party away from 
extremist control.  It received much criticism from the Unionist community in Belfast and was 
even boycotted by several newspaper shops.  This did not deter the Telegraph from continuing to 
reach both sides of the conflict in all six counties, making it the most widely distributed paper 
from the capital.
51
   
 During the years of the Troubles, the paper’s headquarters and several branch offices 
became targets of bombings by paramilitary organizations.  Also over this period, it is estimated 
that upwards of 100 of their distribution vans were hijacked by gunmen.  One delivery man on 
the west Belfast run, Barney Campbell, was hijacked some twenty times.  The newspaper 
developed a system of responding to paramilitary threats and continued to circulate despite 
efforts to derail its production.
52
  Despite the violence and turmoil of the Troubles, it is the 
hunger strike of 1981 that served as the biggest challenge to a newspaper that served a polarized 
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community.  Unfortunately, the violence of the time took center stage for many in Northern 
Ireland, including its press coverage.  Several of the Telegraph’s reporters were singled-out by 
paramilitary men to be taken for ‘joy rides’ from which they amassed information for their 
stories.
53
  Throughout the strike, the paper struggled to continue distributing its papers to both 
the Catholic and Protestant communities of Northern Ireland.  Regardless of these efforts to give 
fair and impartial news coverage, the placement of the paper amidst the violence and turmoil 
cannot be overlooked.  The Telegraph and its staff were working on the front lines of the conflict 
and the effect of such proximity to the violence may be reflected in its coverage by more 
emphasis on ending paramilitary violence than understanding the political context for such 
violence. 
 
The Irish Independent 
 The Irish Independent was founded in December of 1891 and sponsored by William 
Parnell and the Parnellite Party in order to counter the anti-Parnellite papers of the day.  The 
paper, though appearing after Parnell’s death, became known as the record for speeches from 
Parnellite leaders and any presently relevant political information on the party.  Unfortunately, 
business considerations took second place to politics and as a result, the paper suffered chronic 
financial problems until the beginning of the twentieth century when it was bought by William 
Martin Murphy.  Its first daily paper was printed on 2 January 1905.  The paper’s new leadership 
devoted its energies toward cost-cutting, an aggressive advertising campaign, and soon became 
the most widely read newspaper in Ireland.  Despite its wide audience, the paper received 
endless criticism for its strong anti-British coverage.
54
  The paper was especially critical of the 
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expansion of the British Empire and mirrored sentiments expressed by most of Ireland’s 
nationalist population.  While the original Parnellite paper was forthright about its radical anti-
imperialism, Murphy’s Independent expressed a less extreme version of anti-imperialism and 
therefore reached a wider audience.  The paper supported a mutually beneficial relationship with 
Britain but recognized the limitations of a foreign power in developing Irish resources and 
treating Irish nationalists as equal citizens.
55
  Ultimately, the paper expressed moderate pro-
nationalist sentiments that mirrored the most common views among the Irish Catholics. 
 Over its century long tenure in Dublin, the Independent has consistently remained the 
most widely read newspaper in all of Ireland.  If anything, it has remained a voice for the 
nationalist population and has continued to serve first and foremost the people of Ireland.  For 
this reason, and its independence from most of Northern Ireland’s politics and conflict, the 
Independent may have offered a more even coverage of the strike and acknowledged the 
underlying factors contributing to the violence.  Being removed from the conflict yet still near in 
cultural and geography to Northern Ireland gave news in the Republic an up-close view of the 
conflict without any direct involvement.  Thus, any bias expressed by the Republic and the 
Independent would have been to a lesser degree than papers such as the Telegraph which found 
themselves placed in the crossfire of the conflict. 
 
Chapter Two: Research Analysis 
Quantitative Analysis 
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 A quantitative analysis of the collected data is important to understanding the general 
span of coverage and media trends for the hunger strike.  These trends will also later serve to 
support the qualitative data.  It is undeniable that the hunger strike amassed a significant amount 
of publicity and media attention.  Of the 546 articles collected in relation to the hunger strike, 
around two-thirds came from the Belfast Telegraph while the remaining articles were published 
in the Irish Independent.  The sheer volume of articles published reveals the heightened interest 
of the public in the hunger strike.  Even considering immediate political geography, the 196 
articles published in the Independent during the strike’s span of less than eight months also 
attests to the international interest that the strike was able to attract.   
 The monthly distribution of articles published during the strike follows the main events 
of the strike and shows that the peak of newspaper coverage of the strike was not toward the end 
as the hunger strikers intended.  Figure 1 shows that the distribution of articles by month follows 
the trend of events during the strike, with the highest volumes published in the months of April, 
May, and July.  It was during the month of April that Bobby Sands was able to run for, and win, 
the Fermanaugh/South Tyrone MP by-election.  The election attracted a large amount of 
publicity for the strike, especially after Sands’ victory. The month of May follows April as 
another high volume month as Sands became the first casualty of the strike on 5 May 1981.  
During that month, three strikers would follow Sands to the grave, bringing the death toll high 
enough to stimulate an increase in media coverage of the strike.  The month of July also shows a 
high volume of articles published in both newspapers.  The five-week period that lapsed between 
the deaths of the fourth and fifth strikers was the most critical period to the strike’s negotiations 
and can likely be attributed to this increase in media coverage.  When these negotiations failed to 
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reach an accepted resolution before the fifth striker died on 8 July 1981, tension, speculation, and 
news coverage increased.   
The significance of the month-by-month article distribution lies in the events of each 
respective month and also within the general pattern that the coverage takes.  Figure 1 shows that 
the peak of media attention to the strikes happened during the third month of the strike in both 
papers.  The initial goal of the prisoners in staggering their deaths to increase pressure is not 
reflected in the volume of media coverage.  It declined steadily after the third month, which was 
not even halfway through the duration of the strike.  It is likely that the media’s decrease in 
coverage of the strike reflected the waning interest of readers.  The pressure that the strikers 
theorized would build by staggering their deaths does not materialize in the data collected from 
this study. 
  
 
The tone of the articles was also analyzed by labeling articles that contradicted with the 
goals and perceptions of the strikers as “negative” and those that seemed to be consistent as 
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“positive.”  Articles that did not seem to either reflect or contradict these goals and perceptions 
were labeled as “neutral.”  An article considered “positive” did not have to support the strike 
itself as long as it reflected the authentic intentions of the strikers.  The distribution of these 
articles is shown in Figures 2 and 3, which show there is a vastly negative interpretation of the 
hunger strike, meaning that the media’s portrayal of the strike differed significantly from the 
hunger strikers’ intentions.  Even considering the proximity of the Telegraph to the strike, it has 
only a 15% increase from the Independent in negative articles overall.  Both papers have around 
the same percentage of neutral articles. This data shows the possible effect that the media could 
have on how the public perceived the strike.  Regardless of whether or not the strikers 
proclaimed themselves to be politically motivated and willing to commit acts of self-sacrifice in 
the name of their cause, the media’s less heroic interpretation is what reached the public. 
 
   
The front page articles of each paper were also assessed separately since these are the 
most widely read and usually contain the most important or most attention-grabbing articles.  As 
can be seen in Figures 4 and 5, around one-third of the articles published about the hunger strike 
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made front page news in both papers.  This shows the interest and publicity that the strike had 
generated in both countries.  What should also be noted is that the overall percentage of negative, 
positive, and neutral front page articles is consistent with the percentages of the entire 
newspaper.  Although the articles in both papers were vastly negative in nature, the articles 
published on the front pages were no more negative or positive than the rest.  It was 
hypothesized that these articles would show a higher percentage of negative coverage as they 
received the most attention; this trend, however, was not supported by the data. 
 
      
 
In conclusion, it can be seen from the quantitative analysis that both papers, regardless of 
whether from the north and south, focused heavily on the hunger strikes.  Contrary to the hunger 
strikers’ intentions, however, media coverage of the strike peaked in the third month, long before 
the last six strikers would meet their fate.  The high volume of negative articles shows that 
readers were being given reports that did not provide the kind of coverage the hunger strikers had 
intended and hoped for.  The coverage of the strike in front page articles was consistent with the 
general newspaper coverage.  This quantitative analysis is important to understanding the general 
Black 41 
 
patterns of reporting and how those patterns could have affected public opinion of the strike.  In 
the next section, a qualitative analysis of the articles will be made focusing on the components of 
legitimacy. 
 
Qualitative Analysis 
Overview 
 The qualitative analysis of the Independent and the Telegraph will focus on the 
components of legitimization of the hunger strikers as portrayed in the content of the newspaper 
articles.  Since the Catholic community of Northern Ireland had the potential to legitimize the 
hunger strike, it is important to note how the different aspects of this legitimacy were either 
supported or undermined in the newspaper articles.  For the purposes of this research, six aspects 
that played into the legitimacy of the strike were chosen to be analyzed.  The articles on the 
strikes collected for this data were separated into sections and then the most significant articles 
were selected for specific analysis.  Each section is devoted to a different aspect of media 
portrayal that could have served to create a barrier between the hunger strikers and their cause 
gaining legitimacy.   
The first three sections of this analysis on the coverage of elections, the portraits of the 
strikers, and the reports of death and violence from paramilitaries will focus on the hunger 
strikers’ claim that they were politically motivated.  The elections are particularly important for 
showing not only their political motivation, but, also popular support from the electoral 
communities in the north and south of the country.  The last three sections will discuss how the 
strikers’ self-sacrifice was portrayed in the newspapers through the sections on suicide, Catholic 
Church disapproval, and speculation that the strikers were merely pawns of their organization.  
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The aspect of true self-sacrifice is important to the legitimacy of the strikes because it was the 
basis for which the hunger strikers showed their dedication to their cause.  If their actions were 
not seen by the public as being of acts of self-sacrifice, whether through the categorization of the 
deaths as immoral suicides, the lack of ideological support from the Catholic Church, or lack of 
free will, then they could not have gained legitimacy in the public’s eyes.  Legitimacy from the 
public is the key ingredient needed to achieve their goals.  Examining the newspapers’ role in the 
legitimization of the strike is crucial to understanding its eventual outcome. 
 
Election Coverage 
 The political elections that took place during the hunger strike were an important tool that 
the strikers used in their attempt to gain legitimacy.  Running for, and winning, elections would 
be evidence of popular support.  If they were elected as Members of Parliament, it would be 
difficult to argue that their motivations were criminal and not political.  They hoped that their 
electoral success would speak for itself and legitimize their cause.  Unfortunately for these newly 
elected officials, the Independent and the Telegraph downplayed their electoral victories and 
focused instead on the ethical and political dilemmas surrounding the election. 
 Because of its location in Dublin, the Independent wrote from outside the context of the 
first election.  Before the Fermanaugh- South Tyrone by-election took place, writers of the 
Independent were busy weighing the odds of a Nationalist victory.  The political balance of 
power in Westminster would not have been threatened by the election, but it was made clear that 
Westminster officials were wary of the possible level of support for the IRA’s hunger strike that 
the election could show: 
At the end of the day there is only one real issue to be decided here.  What is the level of support 
within the community for the IRA hunger strike now in progress at the Maze Prison in support of 
the demand for political status for convicted Republican prisoners?  That is the crux of the matter 
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and that is what the British, who have consistently taken a hard line on the hunger strike, are keen 
to discover.  This is the first time the electorate in the North has had the opportunity to 
demonstrate the strength of feeling for the prison controversy.  Robert Sands the Republican 
candidate has gone 41 days without food, and some indication of the support for his action and 
demands among the ordinary people will emerge from his showing at the polls.
56
 
 
The election was the first opportunity for the hunger strikers to prove to the British government 
that they were capable of rallying mass support for their cause.  In this regard, the election was 
seen as a critical test of the hunger strike.   
 Although the most basic explanation for his victory would have been electoral support 
from the Northern Irish Nationalist community, the Independent cast doubt on this theory by 
accounting by offering alternate explanations.  Because Sands was the only Nationalist candidate 
on the ballot, the Independent claimed that the large nationalist population of Fermanaugh-South 
Tyrone had been in effect disenfranchised by the election.  This constituency, based on past 
elections, had typically voted in favor of the more moderate nationalist party, the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP).  Thus it was speculated that Sands would have not been 
elected had there been another Nationalist candidate on the ballot.  The Independent blamed 
those responsible for putting Sands’ name on the ballot for having more concern for “publicity 
for Sands and for the H-Block hunger protest” than for the democratic representation of 
Nationalists in Northern Ireland.
57
  This changed the focus of the election from the electoral 
support of Sands to the possible manipulation and disenfranchisement of the Fermanaugh-South 
Tyrone constituency.   
Another explanation for the victory concerned the humanitarian aspect of the strike.  If 
the vote was not a Nationalist versus Unionist vote, then it could have been an emotional one for 
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a man suffering in prison after over forty days on hunger strike.
58
  The coverage of the election 
also centered on the problems facing the British government with a man in prison now holding a 
seat in their Parliament.  Hesitant to expel Sands from his seat, the British House of Commons 
passed a Bill not long after the election to prohibit a prisoner from standing in a parliamentary 
election.
59
  The election dilemma was depicted as a fundamental problem for the British electoral 
system and not as a potential political victory for the hunger strike. 
As the first electoral success of the hunger strike, the Sands election received the most 
publicity, but his successors and fellow Republican prisoners would also win the spotlight during 
their political campaigns.  Since the British government had now banned prisoners from running 
in elections, the Republican prisoners turned to the Republic of Ireland’s political body, the Dail.  
While the Republic was also surprised at the success of the H-Blocks campaign in the elections, 
the Independent once again shifted the focus away from the demands of the strikers and 
deciphered the results as a message to the Irish government that its people wanted an end to the 
strike.  However, the focus of the newspaper was neither on the prisoners’ demands nor the 
support for those demands but, on the inaction of the government.  As an H-Block Committee 
leader was quoted, 
“We didn’t set out to bring down the government, but to show that there is a depth of feeling of 
disappointment with Fianna Fail and Mr. Haughey because they did not take the necessary steps to 
save the lives of four prisoners.”60 
 
It was the human cost of the hunger strike that was the primary concern of the Irish people.  
Their electoral decisions showed supported for the lives at stake and the inability of the Irish 
government to mediate an agreement between the British and the Republican prisoners. The 
elections were depicted as an expression of the impatience of the Irish people over the 
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continuation of the strike.  There was a definitive avoidance of speculation that the election could 
have meant that the electorate supported the political goals or demands of the strikers. 
 The Belfast Telegraph, reporting in Northern Ireland on the Sands election, gave a strong 
anti-H-Blocks message from the time it was announced that Sands would stand as a candidate.  
Before the election took place the paper noted the futility of electing a prisoner who stood on a 
platform of violence.  If elected without challenge, the seat in Parliament for Fermanaugh-South 
Tyrone would remain vacant until the next general election and its constituency would lack 
parliamentary representation.
61
  As well as the political futility of electing Sands, the claim was 
also made that each vote would be taken by the IRA as direct endorsement for their campaign of 
terror in Northern Ireland.
62
  While these warnings were ultimately unsuccessful in influencing 
the outcome of the Sands election, the results of the election in turn were used to undermine the 
important political message they would have otherwise supported. 
 After Sands’ electoral victory, the evident electoral success of the H-Blocks campaign 
was not acknowledged.  Instead, reporting shifted toward the possible disqualification of Sands 
as an MP.
63
  As in the Independent, the consequences of not having legislation that forbade 
prisoners from running for Parliament were seen as the main issue surrounding the election.  The 
possible legitimizing effect of the election was greatly downplayed by the articles, some taking a 
more condescending tone toward the electorate themselves for electing a man in prison for 
criminal offenses.  As an article on 11 April proclaimed, 
“What a tragic result.  What a defeat for the Unionist Party, for the SDLP, for the Government and 
for all the moderate voices in Northern Ireland which have been attempting to divert the two 
communities away from confrontation.  It was a wholly unusual and, it is to be hoped, never-to-
be-repeated by-election.  But after every allowance has been made for the special factors in 
Fermanaugh South Tyrone – the straight fight between two prime symbols of Unionism and 
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Republicanism, the sympathy for a hunger striker, and the Republicans’ skilful avoidance of the 
connection with violence – it has to be admitted that the result amounts to the biggest fillip to the 
IRA since the introduction of internment.”64 
 
The disappointment and disapproval explicitly stated in the above excerpt characterizes Sands’ 
victory as a travesty for those who are politically moderate and wish for a non-violent solution to 
the political woes of Northern Ireland.   As with the Independent, the Telegraph explains the 
results in multiple ways, each of which does not assume support for the political goals of the 
strikers.  The main issue for debate was not whether the results showed support for granting the 
prisoners political status but, rather if they showed popular support for the IRA and its acts of 
violence throughout Northern Ireland. 
As seen in the Independent’s election coverage, it was assumed that the H-Blocks 
campaign was on borrowed time.  The electorally moderate Nationalist majority in Fermanaugh-
South Tyrone was given the choice between two extremes and thus opted for the Nationalist one.  
There was comfort in suggesting that given a wider range of moderate candidates to choose from 
in the next month’s Council elections, the electoral support for the H-Blocks campaign would 
decline markedly.  Until those elections, however, disbelief of, and speculation about, the Sands 
election results would continue throughout the United Kingdom.  The attitude of the English 
toward the results was especially humiliating for the Northern Irish electorate: 
“In Britain, where there is only a passing understanding of Northern Ireland affairs, the result must 
come as a deep shock, challenging all the accepted wisdom about attitudes to violence and prison 
protests.  People will be tempted to look at Ulster from a different perspective, and perhaps to 
reassess their relationship with such a strangely misguided community.  The steeples of 
Fermanaugh must seem even drearier and more distant than ever today.”65 
 
Those in other parts of the United Kingdom were portrayed as interpreting the election results as 
public support in Northern Ireland for violence.   
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The results of the election became an embarrassment to the electorate of Fermanaugh-
South Tyrone:  
“It is far too late, but one wonders if they fully considered the effect of their actions and the 
ammunition it lends to the extreme loyalists.  For the Democratic Unionists, hoping to make the 
most of the crucial local government elections, the by-election vote seems to confirm the wildest 
claims of its leaders.  A hunger striker is an MP, because tribal loyalties of Republicanism were 
stronger than a sense of right and wrong, but the authorities have been quick to emphasize that no 
response will be forthcoming on the H-Blocks issue.  The demand for political status does not 
suddenly acquire respectability or acceptability just because of a by-election vote.”66 
 
Although the results were seen as a misguided and an unfortunate stimulant of ideological 
polarization in Northern Ireland, Sands’ electoral victory did not mean victory for his cause, at 
least from the perspective of newspaper coverage of it.  Regardless of the underlying political 
significance and meaning of the election results, the outcome of the hunger strike would remain 
unchanged. 
 Not long after the initial shock of the election results, both the Telegraph and the British 
government shifted their focus to justifying unseating Sands as MP.  Provisional Sinn Fein 
representatives were quick to accuse those members of the British government who wished to 
remove Sands from office as proving the limitations of non-violent political action.
67
  Any action 
from the British government would show its interference with the will of the Irish people.  
Parliament did allow Sands to keep his seat and this served as a reminder to the Irish people of 
the results of their vote.  As an article on 13 April read, 
“It is a time for thinking clearly, rather than emotionally, and the disadvantages of a move to ban 
Mr. Sands far outweigh the advantages.  It would be a repudiation of violence, which would serve 
a purpose, but it would also give the IRA another weapon in their propaganda war.  Headlines 
would appear round the world: “Britain expels hunger striker from Parliament” and this could be 
twisted to amount to a repudiation of the democratic process.  No, a majority voted for Mr. Sands, 
in full knowledge of what he represents, and the people of Northern Ireland –and the United 
Kingdom –have to live with the consequences.”68 
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The emphasis remained on safeguarding the democratic process of the United Kingdom in spite 
of the proposed “propaganda victory” for the IRA and its acts of violence.  The importance of 
preventing such results in future elections took the foreground: 
“The deed has been done, exposing the naked tribalism in Fermanaugh-South Tyrone, but, to 
prevent any repetition, Parliament should now consider laying down tighter ground rules for 
elections to Westminster.  Does it make sense, ultimately, to let candidates stand who cannot take 
their seats?  Democratic rights are one thing, but permitting them to be abused, for propaganda 
purposes, is another.”69 
 
The emphasis was again placed on the abuse of democratic rights for the purpose of gaining a 
propaganda victory for the IRA.   
The elections in Northern Ireland and the Republic could have been significant political 
victories for the Republican prisoners had they been depicted as evidence of support for 
achieving political status.  Both newspapers offered several theories to explain the outcome of 
the elections, but neither accepted that the election results were evidence of the legitimacy of the 
Republican cause.  These alternate explanations and questions about electoral processes served 
to shift focus from the possible political victory the election could have served.  The elections 
could have sent a strong message to both the government and the Irish people that the hunger 
strikers and their demands were supported by a large body of citizens in Northern Ireland.  
Instead, the media served as a useful tool to detract from this message. 
 
Portraits of the Strikers 
 The strikers themselves were individually given a large amount of the media’s attention 
throughout the strike.  Each striker was referenced by name, town of origin, and a basic 
biography was given as the men joined the strike, reached the critical period, and ultimately died.  
Giving such personal details on the strikers and their lives would add a humanitarian dimension 
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to the strike.  These written portraits and updates throughout the strike served to humanize the 
strikers, but also in many ways to criminalize them.  In both papers, while accounts may have 
aroused sympathies for the men dying on hunger strike, they did not justify their actions or the 
actions of their organization.  As is consistent with the general trend of coverage shown in the 
quantitative analysis, interest and attention to each striker varied greatly and was dependent upon 
their placement in the strike.  Those who began it were given much more attention from the 
papers than were those at the end of it.  This trend shows that as the strike wore on, pressure to 
resolve the strike diminished. 
 The beginning of the second Republican hunger strike in the Maze prison was depicted 
rather anticlimactically in the Independent.  A very small article of scarcely more than ten lines 
acknowledged the start of the strike with Bobby Sands from the Lower Falls area of Belfast 
refusing his breakfast on the morning of 1 March.
70
  This lack of interest was probably due to its 
lack of novelty.  There was no reason to believe, after the first strike, that the second would bring 
anything new to the negotiating table.  A few days afterward, an article of similar length 
announced that Francis Hughes would become the second prisoner to join the hunger strike.  
This time not only was his place of origin noted (Bellaghy, Co. Derry), but also his 
imprisonment in February of 1980 for the murder of one soldier and the attempted murder of 
another.
71
  This pattern of noting the crimes for which the strikers were imprisoned continues 
throughout the coverage.  Even as late in the strike as July, the small and rather uniform articles 
that announced the addition of another prisoner on strike held to the formula of name, city and 
county of origin, and the crime for which they are imprisoned.  As noted in an article on 9 July 
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announcing the commencement of prisoner Patrick McKeown’s fast, McKeown was currently 
serving a 15 year sentence for IRA membership and the bombing of a hotel.
72
   
Their crimes are noted at other times throughout the articles in conjunction with 
humanitarian concerns or updates on the health of the strikers.  As an article on 15 April titled 
“Bobby Sands ‘deteriorating’” states: 
“A Northern Ireland Office spokesman said of Sands, who is serving 14 years for arms offences: 
‘He is showing signs of some deterioration.’  His condition was giving no cause for concern ‘at 
the moment.’”73 
 
Sands had, by this time, already completed 45 days of his hunger strike and was beginning to 
reach a critical condition.  While noting his crimes may serve as background information, it is 
more likely that it serves to remind the reader of the crimes that Sands had committed.  This 
would not have lent creditability to the strikers’ profession of political motivation.  Moreover, 
the labeling of these men as “prisoners,” which was often seen in the articles, would have incited 
from the Irish public the traditional distain for those who are found to be on the wrong side of the 
law.   
 As well as noting the strikers’ specific crimes, the Independent also referred to their 
crimes using the general term “terrorist offenses.”74 Supporting terrorists or terrorism would 
likely have received a negative response from most in the community.  This also calls into 
question, both implicitly and explicitly, the motivations of the strikers.  It is difficult to reconcile 
the criminal nature of their actions as depicted in the Independent with their claims of political 
motivation.   
 The shock and interest after the deaths of the strikers diminished after the novelty of 
Sands’ death.  On the day of Sands’ death alone, there were eight articles about him published in 
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the Independent.  Several of the Sands articles were featured on the front page of the newspaper 
and almost every article spanned at least half a page.  The same smiling and youthful photo of 
Sands that would become widely recognized and immortalized in Northern Ireland appeared 
twice on this day, as well as a picture of his grieving mother.  The next three strikers to die were 
given considerably less attention in the newspaper.  Second striker Francis Hughes was given a 
spread of a significant portion of a page of the paper on 13 May, although not the front page 
attention Sands had achieved.
75
  After this, the articles focused less on the personal histories and 
backgrounds of the strikers and more on the current status of the negotiations between the 
strikers and the British government.   
 Although these men were depicted often as violent criminals without regard for the 
sanctity of life, there was a sense of tragedy in their deaths.  Many of the articles after the deaths 
of each striker took care to note the situational and humanitarian factors that contributed to their 
ultimate fall from societal grace.  Their deaths called for reflection on the period of the Troubles 
in Northern Ireland and the young paramilitary men it had created.  As seen in this article on 5 
May immediately after the death of Sands: 
“Sands was born on March 9, 1954, one of the generation of Northern youngsters whose lives 
were dramatically shaped by the “troubles.”  He was just 15 years old when British troops arrived 
on the streets of Belfast, and at an age when most teenagers are following girls and pop groups, he 
joined the Provisionals.  By the time he was 18, Sands had been arrested in Lisburn, Co Antrim 
and charged with possessing four hand guns.”76 
 
There was a sense that the hunger strike, and the hunger strikers themselves, were products of the 
political troubles that plagued Northern Ireland.   
The Telegraph’s portrayal of the strikers was not all that different from the 
Independent’s.  The beginning of the strike did arouse more coverage from the Telegraph but it 
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was not necessarily a call to alarm.  A front page article on 2 March announced the beginning of 
the strike along with skepticism about its possible achievements. 
“In what must have been a preplanned move, the IRA prisoners in the H-Blocks and Armagh have 
come off their dirty protest, in order, they say, ‘to highlight the main areas of our demands.’  
Doubt still remains about what the main demands are, but it will be a relief that this degrading 
practice has been suspended.  As to what the one-man hunger strike is supposed to achieve, there 
already seems to be some confusion among the prisoners.”77 
 
The article also emphasized that political status would not be achieved, regardless of this second 
strike.  There was a definitive lack of enthusiasm and urgency in the article, giving a sense of the 
same routinization that appears in the Independent.  If anything, more attention was given to 
expressing relief with the end of the Dirty Protest, which was seen as an important step toward 
ending the prison protests altogether. 
 The Telegraph also took note of the crimes of the strikers, emphasizing their names, 
places of origin, and reasons for imprisonment.  On 13 March, the addition of Francis Hughes to 
the strike was announced through an article titled, “‘Most wanted’ man Hughes set to join hunger 
strike.”  Hughes was once at the top of the RUC’s most wanted list for the murder of 23-year-old 
paratrooper, Lance Corporal David Jones, and a fact not forgotten in this article.
78
  Hughes had 
previously gained notoriety through wanted posters that appeared throughout Northern Ireland 
during the several years that he was on the run.
79
  From the reader’s standpoint, it would have 
been difficult to empathize with a murderer who claimed his actions that cost others their lives 
were politically motivated.   
A sense of the public’s loss of interest in the strike was also felt through the articles of the 
Telegraph.  Even more than in the Independent, the succession of deaths quickly became routine 
with each death receiving less press than the one before it.  While the hunger strike itself did not 
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elicit much attention at the beginning, the novelty of Bobby Sands’ death did.  The men 
succeeding Sands in death received progressively less media attention.  The novelty of, and 
interest in, the hunger strike had by the tenth death almost completely evaporated, having been 
replaced with a sense of fatigue and routinization.  Like in the Independent, more of the articles 
surrounding the strike focused on the diplomatic relations and negotiations between the British 
government and the prisoners, calling into question the futility of each additional death. 
This large volume of coverage on the individual strikers themselves peaked with Sands 
and slowly declined over the first four strikers and decreased more dramatically over the last six 
deaths.  It would seem as though death on hunger strike quickly lost the interest of the public or 
became routine enough that it did not merit a significant amount of press coverage.  It may also 
be worth noting that while the coverage of the individual deaths declined as the death toll 
mounted, coverage of the negotiations increased.  The news of more men dying on the hunger 
strike seemed to lose its appeal in favor of progress in negotiations.  This may have also added 
pressure on the British government to reach an agreement with the strikers, but that pressure did 
not include meeting the strikers’ demands.  The public seemed to continue to lose interest in the 
strikers’ cause as the novelty of their deaths began to fade. 
Both the Independent and the Telegraph depict the strikers and their personal histories in 
a light that serves to deemphasize the political nature of their cause.  Neither paper portrayed the 
strikers in an outright positive or supportive light.  The criminal nature of the strikers’ actions 
before the strike and the ongoing violence throughout the strike was emphasized to a degree that 
would have deterred both audiences from supporting the strikers on political grounds.  This 
would have undermined their claim of political motivation, a key component of legitimacy for 
the strike. 
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Death and Violence  
 Death and violence at the hands of Republican paramilitaries were reported in the media 
throughout the fast, often comparing the lives of innocent victims to those lost by the strikers.  
Also among the perpetrators of violence in Northern Ireland were members of the H-Block 
Protest organization whose actions were devoted to achieving the prisoners’ demands and often 
turned violent, especially during the critical periods of the strike.  Neither the Independent nor 
the Telegraph failed to report the violence carried out by Republican paramilitaries and the H-
Blocks organization, which would have directly contradicted the prisoners’ protests that they 
were not criminals or criminally motivated.   
 The Independent compared the voluntary acts of the hunger strikers to the victims of their 
organizations and the H-Block riots.  The escalation in violence due to the hunger strike was not 
lost on the media: 
 The people in the background who are trying to rouse emotions higher (on both sides of the 
Border) are playing no one’s game but their own and we should remember that.  Bobbie Sands has 
voluntarily committed himself to a fast to death – a grim and even courageous course of action, 
but a voluntary one, nevertheless.  If he ended his fast today the violence would taper off.
80
 
 
On 28 April, a little more than a week before Sands’ death, the Independent reported in a front 
page article, the “fading hope” of compromise as tensions and violence rose.  Before reporting 
on the condition of Sands on his 58
th
 day on strike, the paper notes the increase in activity of 
Loyalist paramilitaries as a result of the strike and the death of a member of the RUC by an 
INLA bomb in West Belfast.  It was then reported that residents in the North were making house 
calls in the West Belfast area advising other residents to board up their homes and stockpile food 
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in preparation for Sands’ death.81  The news on Sands came second to the report of growing 
tensions and continuation of casualties by members of the same organization that several hunger 
strikers belonged.   
 The death day of the eighth hunger striker Kieran Doherty was reported alongside the 
funeral of a murdered ex-RUC officer and the murders of two on-duty RUC officers by the 
IRA.
82
  Deaths from paramilitary violence were often reported alongside the deaths of the hunger 
strikers to emphasize the criminal nature of the organizations to which the hunger strikers 
belonged.  On 5 August, following the funeral of Doherty, the Independent reported that an 
increasing body count spiked fears that many more would have to die before any new initiative 
would be proposed by the British.  A grim picture was described:  
The Thatcher Government last night was also well aware that it had been a day when both aspects 
of the Northern tragedy had been reflected.  In Co. Tyrone there were harrowing scenes as the 
heart-broken widow of an RUC man, killed by the Provos, repeatedly screamed his name and the 
former Moderator of the Presbyterian Church, Dr. Ronald Craig, told mourners that he could not 
understand how anyone could think of talking to hunger-strikers, “or other criminals”, while such 
killings continued.
83
 
 
The emphasis was placed on the violence carried out by the organizations to which the hunger 
strikers belonged as if to show their true nature and intentions.   
 Because of its location in the capital of Northern Ireland, the Telegraph reported 
paramilitary violence to the communities that were witnessing this violence first hand.  Thus it 
comes with little surprise that the death and violence associated with Republican paramilitaries 
would be well covered in the paper.  An article that covered an H-Blocks protest march 
numbering 15,000 emphasized the unease felt by the police and even narrowed in on the arrest of 
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one adolescent for stone throwing.
84
  There was an emphasis on the potential for violence 
between the police and the protesters. 
 The government and media continued with the hard line that the strikers were no better 
than those committing crimes on the streets; the only difference was that the strikers were behind 
bars.  At the beginning of the strike, the Deputy Secretary of State Michael Alison was quoted as 
referring to the strike as a different type of paramilitary violence, but violence nevertheless: 
“Do not forget that a prison hunger strike is not a sort of yoga exercise.  It is a form of violence, 
although in this instance self-inflicted, and like violence outside the prison, it is designed to coerce 
the Government into meeting terrorists’ demands,” he said.  But the Government would not be 
coerced by this action, or any other inside or outside the prisons, into granting some kind of 
special indulgence to those convicted of the most brutal crimes.
85
 
 
Calling to mind that those committing crimes outside of the prison were not so different from 
those inside emphasized the criminality of the strikers.  The violence that ensued after the death 
of Bobby Sands was used as an appeal to reject violence.  Secretary of State Humphrey Atkins 
was quoted as emphasizing the futility of violence, especially in regardless to pointless death.  
He considered the death of Sands to be more one pointless death in a long line of them.  The 
difference between Sands and the deaths of others in Northern Ireland however, was that Sands 
chose his death while the victims of his organization did not.
86
 
 The fear of violence was also an issue that the Telegraph did not take lightly, although 
steps were taken so that no paramilitary organization would benefit from fear-tactics used.  The 
paper took care not to overestimate the capabilities of the IRA in building tensions and potential 
outbreaks of violence following the deaths of the hunger strikers.  Doing so would have given 
the organization more power and control in the North by preying on the fears of its communities.  
Government officials were summarized as believing that the threat of large-scale violence after 
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the death of Sands was not as imminent as previous reports had suggested.  International 
journalists were accused of encouraging people to commit acts of violence in order to provide 
them with graphic photographs for their newspapers and journals.
87
  In this regard, the 
international media was seen as contributing to the propaganda and violence of the strikes.  
Giving in to this publicity would only further escalate the potential for violence.  It was also 
made clear that no more British troops were to be brought in, suggesting that any riots that 
ensued from Sands’ death would be manageable.88  This same fear of violence was later even 
accused as being a tactic used by the IRA to scare the Northern Catholics into a situation where 
the IRA could emerge once more the “defender” of the Catholic people.89  The same violence 
that was used to turn the Catholics away from supporting the strikers was also used to deflate the 
capabilities of the Republican paramilitaries.   
 The death and violence depicted in both papers serves the important purpose of 
undermining the strikers’ claims of being politically motivated.  If the organization that they 
belonged to continued to carry out acts of indiscriminate violence during the hunger strike, how 
were the communities of Northern Ireland to believe that their motivation was political?  If the 
strikers were to successfully prove their motivation as purely political and undeserving of the 
badge of criminality, then their actions and the actions of their organization would have had to be 
in accordance with this.  The reports of the death and violence in the papers did not support the 
idea of political motivation by either the strikers or their outside organizations. 
 
“Suicides” 
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 Classifying the actions of the strikers as suicides would have seriously threatened the 
legitimacy of their actions given the fundamental religious beliefs of both communities in 
Northern Ireland.  The content and language used in both papers suggested that the actions of the 
hunger strikers were indeed suicides.  Even the mention or occasional labeling of the strikers as 
suicides could have been enough to shed doubt in the minds of readers on the authenticity of the 
strikers’ actions.  Such labeling occurred throughout the coverage of the strike in both papers.   
One article in the Independent was devoted to this paradigm of the hunger strike, 
questioning whether their acts were of suicide or of war.  In comparing the strikers to French and 
German naval captains who ‘went down with their ships,’ writer Dean Charles Gray-Stack states: 
“The young men who have died on hunger-strike do not fit into quite the same category.  On the 
other hand, if they genuinely view the matter in a different light and think of themselves as 
soldiers of a Republic that does not exist in law, while we, as citizens of the Irish State may differ 
with their opinions, we can hardly dismiss them as suicides.”90 
 
Even though Gray-Stack draws an interesting parallel and cautions readers against labeling the 
strikers as suicides, he also points out a fact that undermines the strikers’ cause: the strikers saw 
themselves in a completely different light, as soldiers of a nation that was not yet in existence.  
This difference may in fact have contributed to the community’s dismissal of the deaths as 
suicides.  While the Independent did quote other sources that recognized the actions of the 
hunger strikers as those of self-sacrifice, these sources would not seemed to have outweighed the 
sources that would defame their actions as suicides.   
The quotations of political figures are also especially important for their use of strong 
language suggesting that the hunger strike was a case of mass suicide.  As one Whitehall official 
was quoted before the death of the first striker, “Sands can stop this if he wants to.  No one wants 
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to see him die, but if people decide to commit suicide it is very sad.”91  The line of some 
government officials was to recognize the unfortunate circumstances of the hunger strike yet 
strip all power of propaganda from the strikers themselves.  Even the most seemingly unbiased 
accounts in the articles evoke a sense that the deaths caused directly by the hunger strike were 
suicides.  The brief official statement from the Northern Ireland Office on the day of Sands’ 
death stated:  “Mr. Robert Sands, a prisoner in the Maze, died at 1:17am.  He took his own life 
by refusing food and medical intervention.”92  This statement does not directly mention suicide, 
as do others, but it implies suicide by using the same language that would be used to report one. 
The nature of their deaths was also noted by officials countering the death and violence 
that resulted from the H-block protests.  Northern Ireland Secretary of State Humphrey Atkins 
was quoted in an article on 5 May as stating, “Too many have died by violence in Northern 
Ireland.  In this case it was self inflicted.  We should not forget the many others who have 
died.”93  Although this too is not a direct mention of suicide, paired with the many concurrent 
violent deaths in Northern Ireland from paramilitary violence, the public would not have been as 
willing to label Sands’ death as that of martyrdom.  Overall, the Independent did not take a solid 
stand either for the strikers as martyrs or suicides but this in itself would be enough to undermine 
the strike as a legitimacy building mechanism. 
The Telegraph was generally more explicit than the Independent in implicitly and 
explicitly implying that the actions of the strikers should be considered acts of suicide.  Coverage 
of the strike also emphasized the strikers’ lives as being ‘in own hands’ and as causing their own 
deaths if and when they should occur.  The government and its officials played an integral part in 
these statements in order to deflect responsibility of the deaths from themselves and place it 
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squarely on the hunger strikers.  Minister of State Michael Alison insisted in an article on 27 
April before the deaths: “The lives of the hunger strikers remain, as they have done since they 
began their protests, in their own hands.”94   
The concept of choice was an important element in the labeling of the actions of the 
strikers.  To many, they were given a choice to take their own lives while their victims were not 
given the luxury of such a choice.  This also undermines the concept of self-sacrifice among the 
strikers by comparing their deaths to the deaths of their organization’s victims.  North Down MP 
Mr. James Kilfedder was more explicit in labeling the strikes as suicide in a statement after one 
of his constituents had been killed by IRA violence: 
“It is heart-breaking and sickening to Ulster people, particularly to the relatives of the 2,000 
people murdered by the IRA – and provocative to all law-abiding people in the province, that the 
world’s Press and the British media churns out IRA propaganda about a convicted thug who elects 
to commit suicide when that choice was not given to other people.”95 
 
County Armagh MP Mr. Harold McCusker also made an emotionally charged statement against 
the acts of the strikers, even going as far as to compare their choice to die on hunger strike with 
capital punishment by the state: 
“…we emphatically state once again that if murderers and their associates were executed they 
would not then have the privilege of committing suicide while being portrayed as decent young 
freedom fighters and not inhuman, degenerate and indiscriminate killers of women and children 
and old men.”96 
 
Juxtaposing the strikers’ decision to take their own lives against deaths that had occurred because 
of their organization’s violence simply shows the futility of more deaths and violence, even 
deaths of hunger strikers to achieve political demands.  Overall, there was a general sense of 
frustration that these men could amass so much attention for an act that would normally not have 
been accepted in modern day society.  
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 Neither the Independent nor the Telegraph seemed to seriously consider the strikers’ 
insistence that theirs were acts of self-sacrifice for a just and politically motivated cause.  Too 
many public officials in both Northern Ireland and Ireland were quoted in refutation of these 
claims.  Suicide, as an act of taking one’s own life, could not have been supported by the 
community of Northern Ireland and would have worked against legitimizing the hunger strike. 
 
Involvement of the Catholic Church 
 Opinions from leaders of the Catholic Church were highlighted throughout the news 
coverage of the strike.  The cultural connection between the Republican tradition and 
Catholicism helped facilitate the Church’s involvement in the strike and during the negotiation 
process.  The Catholic community of Northern Ireland would have been influenced by the stance 
of the Church because of the recognition by Catholics of its legitimate authority.  Even the 
British government could not ignore such an influential body as the Catholic Church in Northern 
Ireland.  As a religious and moral body, the Church was the center of justice and morality for 
Irish Catholics and was often charged with the responsibility to condone or condemn the actions 
of the paramilitaries, especially those of the IRA.  With the conflicting humanitarian and political 
concerns of the hunger strike, it is only natural that Catholics would turn toward the Church for 
direction.   
 The Independent included numerous quotations and opinions from Catholic Church 
officials in its coverage of the strike.  An article published the day after the beginning of the 
second hunger strike voiced the opinion of many church officials in its title: “Para-militaries 
‘sinful.’” The article mentioned the opinions of Bishop Daly of Derry, who became one of the 
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main representatives of the Catholic Church during the strike and heavily involved himself in its 
events: 
“He said the hunger strike activities going on outside were the glorification and justification of 
violence, “the most dreadfully degrading acts” –were spawning a frightening erosion of morality 
in the North’s society.”97 
 
The bishop was quoted during a speech to over 1,500 youths in which he denounced joining 
paramilitary organizations as sinful.  Bishop Daly used his position of authority within the 
church as well as religiously charged language to deter involvement in or support for the H-block 
struggle and protests. 
 There was also a significant amount of coverage of the general involvement of the 
Catholic Church in mediating negotiations and encouraging an end to the strike.  A front page 
article on 29 April notes the inability of Papal Envoy Father John Magee to successfully mediate 
a solution before the death of Sands.
98
  This dramatic intervention by the Vatican would send a 
loud message to the Catholics of Ireland as to the seriousness and importance of resolving the 
hunger strike conflict.  When this occurred toward the beginning of the strike, it may have served 
to transform the hunger strike from a prison protest to a legitimate international crisis.  But the 
ultimate failure of the prison leadership to resolve the strike even with the help of a 
representative of the Vatican probably worked against the prisoners’ interests.  Given the level of 
respect and importance of such an official, and the fact that Fr. Magee was an Irishman himself, 
his failure to reach a resolution between the two parties may have cast doubt as to whether such a 
resolution would ever be reached. 
 The use of religiously charged language called into question the theological component 
of the hunger strike.  An example article criticizing the hunger strike after Sands’ death: “The 
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Provisionals, who have shown their indifference to the sanctity of life, have won a publicity 
battle over the British.”99  The Bishop of Ardagh and Clonmacnoise condemned the use of fast 
protests, stating: “The first duty of respect which we owe to ourselves is respect for our own 
lives.”100  Other well known international church officials also spoke out against the hunger 
strike.  On a visit to Northern Ireland, legendary nun Mother Teresa was photographed and 
quoted on many pages of the Independent, speaking out against the hunger strike. 
“‘Anything that destroys life we must not do; anything that destroys life cannot be right,’ she said.  
She prayed that the men of violence ‘may realize that that (violence) is not the way to bring the 
peace, joy and love for which we have been created.  I am praying that they will realize their duty 
towards God and their families,’ said Mother Teresa.”101 
 
Even with such strong rhetoric and language used against the strike, there was a reluctance to 
publicly declare whether or not the acts were considered those of suicide based on Catholic 
teachings. 
 This hesitancy to distinguish between acts of self-sacrifice and suicide based on the 
Church’s teachings reflects an important religious element of Northern Ireland’s paramilitary 
violence.  Practicing Catholics or not, the hunger strikers represented an organization that had 
begun its campaign of violence in defense of the Catholic community.  This placed the Church 
and its leaders in delicate position.  The Bishop of Derry, Dr. Edward Daly, was once again 
quoted with an opinion that reflected the Church’s feelings at the time: 
“While he believed the British Government had been intransigent over the present hunger strike, 
he found it difficult in his own conscience, to morally justify the hunger strike.  But he would not 
describe Bobby Sands’s death as suicide.  ‘I could not accept that.  I do not think he intended to 
bring about his own death.  I think he felt it was a possibility, but he had hoped something else 
would be achieved.’”102 
 
The Church was forced to juggle its strict religious teachings while taking care not to 
undermine the hunger strike or its Catholic supporters.  As noted in the Independent, the hunger 
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strikers received their Last Rites from Catholic priests, a right that under the Catholic tradition 
would not have been granted to those committing suicide.
103
  This would have been an indirect 
way of recognizing the self-sacrifice element of the strike.  Although the Church remained 
largely ambivalent about the nature of the deaths, they were consistent on the political aspect of 
the strike.  Outside of resolving the conflict, the Church reportedly took no stance in support of 
the political demands of the strikers.  They stressed a solution that would respect the 
government’s authority yet resolve the humanitarian concerns of the prison’s living conditions.  
 Fr. Daly was also quoted extensively in the Telegraph for his especially strong statements 
condemning the IRA and the hunger strike.  In an effort to link the hunger strike with its 
organization’s indiscriminate violence, he urged, “If you are invited to support a hunger strike, 
you must first ask the organizing group if it has publicly made known its rejection of murder and 
bombing.”104  Statements such as these would have been potentially more influential in the north 
than the Republic because they expressed the opinions of local church officials and made 
reference to paramilitary violence that had occurred in their communities.  However, the Church 
itself chose to make no unified public statements for or against the strike. 
 The lack of an official statement from the Church caused Northern Protestants and 
newspapers alike to draw some of their own conclusions: 
“‘The hunger strike to the death is a form of violence and surely cannot be condoned by the 
Church as being in accordance with God’s will for man’ – Cardinal Hume.  That is a definitive 
statement, by one of the most influential men in the Roman Catholic Church, which cannot be 
lightly brushed aside.  But does it apply to the hunger strike at the Maze?”105 
 
The article gives no mention of a time or situational frame of this statement by Cardinal Hume, 
but it does imply that such a statement was not made in reference to the current Maze hunger 
strike.  It concludes that the stance of the Catholic Church on past hunger strike protests must 
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hold true to the current hunger strike, regardless of whether an official statement exists.  Articles 
such as this weakened the Church’s ability to influence public opinion in support of the strike.   
 The most significant difference between the Independent and the Telegraph on their 
coverage of the Catholic Church lies within the context of Catholic theology on hunger striking.  
Coverage in the Independent was not nearly as focused on deciphering the Church’s true views 
on hunger striking as it was in the Telegraph, most likely because of the Telegraph’s desire to 
cater to its Protestant audience.  Therefore, the Telegraph went further than quoting the beliefs of 
religious officials and delved into the Church’s religious teachings on death fasts.  This resulted 
in canon law receiving an unprecedented amount of attention in a secular and public newspaper.   
“The attitude of the Roman Catholic Church to the morality of hunger strikes has never been clear-
cut.  There is no doubt that suicide offends against the teaching of the Church.  It is laid down in 
canon law that a person who commits suicide in order, for example, to avoid public disgrace, is 
denied ecclesiastical burial.”106 
 
This particular article also continues with an attempt to explain how Sands may still be allowed 
to receive ecclesiastical burial, thereby granting him an implicit recognition by the church that 
his was not an act of suicide.  Professor of Moral Theology at Maynooth, Fr. Denis O’Callaghan, 
explained: 
“‘The difficulty is that a person on hunger strike is constantly hoping there will be some flexibility 
on the other side,’ he said.  ‘I think the stage comes when a person is no longer capable of taking a 
decision to end his strike.  If he really intends his death, then it is questionable morally.  It 
becomes a question of intent.’”107 
 
 The coverage of the strike in both papers attests to the importance and influence of the 
Catholic Church throughout the hunger strike.  The actions of the Church would have been 
greatly scrutinized during the strike for their connection with the Republican paramilitary 
tradition and their influence over the Catholic community of Northern Ireland.  Due to this 
scrutiny, the Church would have been unable to openly support the actions of the hunger strikers 
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or support their demand to be recognized as special category prisoners.  Individual church 
officials were quoted in both newspapers as condemning paramilitary violence and considering 
the hunger strike to be a simple continuation of this violence.  At the same time, officials who 
did not out-rightly condemn the strike were hesitant to mention the political demands of the 
strikers or to respond to the moral questions surrounding voluntary death on hunger strike.  
While opinions were mixed, no church officials supported the strikers in their political 
objectives. 
 
Pawns of Outside Organization 
 The concept of free will is an essential component of legitimacy for the strike.  If the 
hunger strikers were believed to have been pawns of their organization’s leadership outside of 
the prison, then their deaths would not have accorded the hunger strike legitimacy.  Allegations 
such as this were present in both newspapers.  The political goals of the hunger strike could have 
only been achieved if the free will of the strikers was beyond doubt.   
The Independent stated that the IRA leadership had complete control over the beginning 
and end of the fast.  It was responsible for the deaths of the strikers for refusing to use the 
political opportunities available to them for negotiation.
108
  The resolution of the strike rested in 
the hands of an unbending leadership set on maximizing favorable publicity from the strike.  As 
the strike continued into the month of August, government officials such as the Republic’s 
Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald blamed the Provisional leadership’s interference for the continuation 
of the strike, 
“‘They cannot evade responsibility for the deaths of the hunger strikers although they seek to do 
so by manipulation of the media,’ he said. The Taoiseach charged that the Provo leadership had 
thwarted all efforts to end the hunger strike, ‘It seems to me to be no accident that as the efforts of 
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the Irish Government to help solve the crisis became more public, the efforts of the Provisional 
IRA leadership to obstruct a solution doubled.’”109 
 
 It was even reported that despite what the Provisional leadership had stated, the strike had 
been first sanctioned by IRA officers outside the prison.  It was also noted how recruiting and 
financial contributions to the organization had doubled throughout the strike, implying that the 
goal of the strike was organizational and monetary, not political.
110
  Catholic priest Fr. Flanagan 
was quoted on his opinion of the outside organization’s involvement in an 11 August article: 
“It is similarly disappointing that those who called the hunger strike did not end it whenever they 
achieved a particular electoral victory, both north and south and perhaps spare those members, 
families and communities continuing suffering.”111 
 
A disconnect existed between the media and the strikers as to the origins of the strike and its 
main perpetrators.  Whether or not this disconnect was intentional is unknown but its 
implications are important for understanding this crucial period in the fast.  Claims that the 
hunger strike did not originate from the strikers themselves would call into question whether or 
not the strikers were influenced by the leadership’s expectations and goals for the strike.  It also 
questions whether or not the men were in full control of their own decisions and actions or 
whether they were ordered through the command structure of the IRA to carry out a fast to the 
death.  Victims, not martyrs, can be made from men forced to die for their organization’s 
propaganda purposes.   
 The Telegraph was even more explicit in its assumptions than was the Independent.  It 
assumed that the strike had been ordered by the IRA’s leadership and would end whenever the 
leadership decided.  The hunger strikers themselves, as lower-ranking members in a military 
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command system, were forced to abide by orders and continue the strike. Irish Prime Minister 
Dr. Garret Fitzgerald was quoted as saying: 
 “The prisoners represent themselves as belonging to a military structure.  It is clear that those who 
are in charge of this structure can, at any time, end the crisis by ordering the hunger strikers to end 
their protest.  They have not done so.  They cannot evade responsibility in the deaths of the hunger 
strikers, although they seek to do so by manipulation of the media.”112 
 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was quoted as believing the IRA “preferred these men to 
die.”113  It was reported that the strikers were more useful to the leadership dead than they were 
alive for the publicity purposes their deaths served.  From a reader’s standpoint in Northern 
Ireland, any support for the strike would have to be humanitarian based and not directed toward 
achieving the political demands of the IRA’s leadership.   
 Officials throughout Northern Ireland, including RUC Chief Constable John Hermon 
expressed their frustrations with the strikers’ apparent lack of free will. 
Provisional IRA leaders have cold-bloodedly decided that more prisoners must die on hunger 
strike regardless of their own wishes, the Chief Constable has claimed.  Mr. John Hermon said the 
lives of hunger strikers were “mere instruments” of ruthless IRA leaders who were careful not to 
put their own lives at risk.
114 
 
In another article on 25 July, former Ulster Secretary of State Roy Mason was quoted as 
slamming the “manipulators” of the Maze hunger strikers: 
 
“Those people outside the Maze, who are manipulating the minds and bodies of those inside, must 
now recognize that no international, reputable organization, or any body of any kind that has 
visited the Maze prison in recent times, has ever given them any support, solace or comfort.  
Therefore they should now have learned their lesson.  They should not be asking them to fast to 
death when no reputable organization will give them support.”115 
 
One front page article on 5 August titled, “Call to Adams and Morrison- fast yourselves,” 
illustrates the skepticism over the true intentions of the IRA leadership during the strike. This 
quote from West Belfast councilor Will Glendinning would have aroused some amusement at the 
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thought of Provisional Sinn Fein leaders (and suspected IRA leaders) Gerry Adams and Danny 
Morrison actually joining the hunger strike to show their dedication to achieving political status 
for the Republican prisoners.
116
  More skepticism emerged when on 25 September Morrison 
announced that striker Bernard Fox had chosen to be taken off the hunger strike for fear that he 
“was dying too quickly.”117  While the purpose of the strike was to amass the largest amount of 
pressure and support through prolongation of the strikers’ lives, the wording of the article and 
quotation by Morrison seems to suggest that the leadership was the one pulling the puppet’s 
strings.  It was implied that when a hunger striker was no longer of strategic advantage to the 
organization, then and only then were they allowed to end their fast. 
In summary, the Independent and the Telegraph both implied and explicitly stated that 
the leadership was manipulating the hunger strikers, or at the very least prolonging the strike to 
seek maximum publicity.  This aspect of reporting the strikes is especially important to the 
legitimacy of the strike because it puts the hunger strikers in the role of victims of their 
organization’s leadership.  As victims, they were not capable of exercising their own free will in 
participating in and ultimately dying on hunger strike.  The act of hunger striking in order to 
prove the importance and dedication to their cause would have seemed superficial and any 
support expressed for the hunger strikers was in effect only humanitarian concern. 
 
Conclusion 
 Despite their religious and cultural history, the Catholic communities of Northern Ireland 
and the Republic were unable to accept the legitimacy of the hunger strikers’ claims of self-
sacrifice.  The reemerging theme of self-sacrifice as it first appeared with Republican martyr 
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Wolfe Tone was unsuccessful in amassing the public’s sympathy it had over the past two 
centuries.  The data presented in this analysis suggests that the media’s role in the legitimization 
of violent organizations is a pivotal one.  With modern technological advancements, the 
Republican tradition can no longer rely on mythical constructs of its martyrs to gain recognition 
from its community.  The media was able to divert the public’s attention from the underlying 
ideological questions of the strike to a more critical analysis of the strike and its direct and 
indirect effects in Northern Ireland.  Any inconsistencies with Catholic doctrine or accepted 
morality were able to be highlighted through the media as opposed to ignored by the would-be 
martyrologists.  The media as a modern day martyrologist worked against the creation of more 
Republican martyrs.  More directly, the data shows significant evidence that the media played a 
role in the resolution of the strike. 
The data from both the quantitative and qualitative sections of this research suggest that 
the newspaper coverage of the 1981 hunger strike of Northern Ireland may have had a significant 
impact on the resolution of the strike by denying the hunger strikers the public support they 
needed to meet their political objectives.  The design of the staggered deaths was unable to 
achieve its purpose of gradually increasing pressure on the British government.  As can be seen 
from both the quantitative and qualitative sections of this research, newspaper coverage of the 
strike did not increase as the strike progressed; it even declined toward the end.  This volume of 
newspaper coverage is a reflection of the public’s interest in, and concern for, the events of the 
hunger strike.  The largest volume of articles on the hunger strike coincided with the political 
elections at the time and the death of the first striker, not necessarily the events of the strike 
itself.  This showed that the public’s interest was not incrementally increasing with each striker’s 
death, but rather that the public showed the greatest interest in the humanitarian concerns of the 
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strike.  The quantitative data also shows a sharp decline in coverage after the fifth striker’s death 
in July as the deaths became routinized and focus shifted to the British government’s inability to 
immediately resolve the strike.   
The necessary elements of legitimacy from the IRA’s community were undermined by 
the articles in both the Independent and the Telegraph.  The three components of legitimization, 
that the actions of the strikers were of self-sacrifice, of their own free will, and selflessly and 
politically motivated, would not have been upheld by the print media’s depiction of the strike.  
Firstly, the actions of the strikers were not portrayed as self-sacrifice.  On the whole, they were 
treated as suicides that only added to the death toll of a state already too familiar with 
unnecessary death and violence.  The strikers were labeled as immoral in accordance with the 
teachings of the Catholic Church which made the Church unable to fully support the strikers’ 
actions.  Lack of this support and the public scrutiny of Catholic theology further undermined 
their claim of self-sacrifice and deprived them of a powerful support base.  The strikers’ free will 
was thrown into doubt by accusations that accused the outside organization of forcing them to 
die for propaganda purposes.  The lack of communication between the strikers and the public 
prevented them from addressing this accusation.  Finally, the emphasis on the criminal actions of 
the strikers and the ongoing violence outside the prison by their organizations undermined their 
profession of selfless and political motivation.   
Without these three components, the strikers would not have been legitimized by the 
Northern Irish community.  The contrast between the secondary research on the hunger strike 
and its outcome can be explained by the findings of this research.  The research completed on the 
hunger strike has been done retrospectively with the ability to take into consideration primary 
source data from the strikers and the strike’s negotiations.  The public at the time did not have 
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access to this information and were limited to what they read in local newspapers.  These 
newspapers did not reflect the true intentions of the hunger strikers nor did they fully explain the 
ultimate goal of the strike.  The shift in focus from political to humanitarian concerns completely 
neglected the underlying purpose for the strike.  It was special category status that the prisoners 
sought; the changes in prison conditions were only to follow as a result of this recognition of 
political status. 
This analysis has several important implications. It shows that the public’s support for the 
Republican tradition of self sacrifice was beginning to deviate from its historically elevated level.  
It is perhaps evidence that the Irish were beginning to reject their age old traditions in order to 
move away from their internal divisions.  More importantly, this analysis has important 
implications for future governmental actions against terrorist organizations.  The same media 
used as an outlet for gaining legitimacy by these organizations can also be used to prevent them 
from achieving their goals.  The media throughout the 1981 hunger strike played a decisive role 
in the public opinion of the time.  Ultimately, the power that the media holds in the 
legitimization of terrorist organizations may be harnessed against these very same organizations 
and through the power of public opinion, create an atmosphere where indiscriminate violence is 
futile for achieving political goals. 
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